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Betting on Climate Policy: 
Using Prediction Markets to Address 
Global Warming 
Gary M. Lucas, Jr.,†* and Felix Mormann** 
Global warming, sea level rise, and extreme weather events have made 
climate change a top priority for policymakers across the globe. But which 
policies are best suited to tackle the enormous challenges presented by our 
changing climate? This Article proposes that policymakers turn to 
prediction markets to answer that crucial question. Prediction markets 
have a strong track record of outperforming other forecasting mechanisms 
across a wide range of contexts — from predicting election outcomes and 
economic trends to guessing Oscar winners. In the context of climate 
change, market participants could, for example, bet on important climate 
outcomes conditioned on the adoption of particular policies. These 
prediction markets would aggregate policy-relevant information from a 
variety of sources to improve upon existing decision-making methods, 
including expert deliberation, peer review, and cost-benefit analysis. 
Prediction markets also have the potential to overcome resistance to 
climate change mitigation efforts, particularly among market-oriented 
conservatives. We explain how both the federal and state governments 
could use prediction markets to help resolve high-profile controversies, 
such as how best to allocate subsidies to promote clean technology 
innovation and which policy strategy promises the greatest reduction in 
carbon emissions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The question of how to address climate change is a difficult one. 
Most experts agree that the United States should use a carbon tax or 
cap-and-trade program to place a price on the carbon emissions that 
drive global warming.1 In the short term, however, pricing carbon may 
be politically impossible due to resistance from industry, voters, and 
conservative politicians.2 As a result, some argue for second-best 
policies that are less ambitious, but more politically palatable,3 such as 
federal fuel-efficiency standards for automobile manufacturers and 
state-level renewable portfolio standards for electric utilities. Skeptics, 
however, maintain that a second-best policy strategy will cost too 
much and likely prove ineffective.4 
Even if pricing carbon were to become politically feasible, 
complementary policies might still be needed to effectively mitigate 
climate change. In particular, some experts argue that the government 
should heavily subsidize innovation in clean technologies to facilitate 
an economy-wide shift away from fossil fuels and toward renewable 
sources of energy.5 Skeptics, however, cite to past failures and claim 
that politicians would use these “green subsidies” to reward favored 
special interests rather than to benefit the environment.6 
 
 1 See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE: THE STERN 
REVIEW xviii (2007) (explaining that taxing carbon is an effective economic solution to 
excessive carbon emissions); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: 
Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165, 169 (2005); cf. 
Atanas Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmental and Technology Externalities: Policy and 
Investment Implications, 12 EUR. INV. BANK PAPERS, no. 2, 2007, at 134, 137, 140 
(stating that “the optimal outcome” can be met either by an emissions tax high 
enough to “fully internalise the economic cost of emissions” or by supplementing a 
lower tax rate “with direct technology support”). 
 2 See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
903, 930-32 (2011) [hereinafter Renewables Revolution] (discussing the political 
economy obstacles for carbon pricing policies). 
 3 For a discussion of the pros and cons of this approach, see Jonathan M. Gilligan 
& Michael P. Vandenbergh, Accounting for Political Feasibility in Climate Instrument 
Choice, 32 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 5-26 (2014). 
 4 See, e.g., Bjorn Lomborg, Impact of Current Climate Proposals, 7 GLOBAL POL’Y 
109, 111-17 (2016) (arguing that several major climate policy proposals will likely 
prove ineffective). 
 5 See, e.g., Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and 
Climate Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387, 389, 393 (2017) (making the case that 
“innovation snowballing” warrants greater government involvement in the promotion 
of clean tech innovation). 
 6 See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ, THE END OF ENERGY: THE UNMAKING OF AMERICA’S 
ENVIRONMENT, SECURITY, AND INDEPENDENCE 187-95 (2011); CHARLES WEISS & WILLIAM 
B. BONVILLIAN, STRUCTURING AN ENERGY TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 209 (2009) 
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Remarkably, these climate policy debates often turn not so much on 
ideology or values, but instead on predictions about the future. 
Advocates for a given policy make their case by forecasting that the 
policy’s benefits will exceed its costs while opponents forecast the 
opposite. Because of the uncertainty inherent in these forecasts, each 
side can claim that the other is misguided, biased, or corrupt, 
frequently leading to irresolvable disagreement and policy gridlock. 
This Article argues that prediction markets offer hope for an escape 
from this stalemate. Prediction markets are “designed and run for the 
primary purpose of mining and aggregating information scattered 
among traders and subsequently using this information in the form of 
market values in order to make predictions about specific future 
events.”7 In recent years, these markets have garnered increased media 
attention following the proliferation of online betting exchanges that 
allow participants (“traders”) to bet on whether certain events will 
occur in the future. In the simplest type of prediction market, traders 
buy a contract that pays $1 if the designated event happens, say the 
Democratic candidate wins the presidency. In more complex 
conditional prediction markets, traders bet that event x will happen 
contingent on some other event y. Conditional markets are common 
in the context of presidential elections.8 For example, a prediction 
market contract for the 2020 presidential election might pay $1 if the 
Democratic nominee wins, with bets called off unless the nominee is 
Elizabeth Warren. If such a contract trades for $0.55, then we can 
interpret its price as the market’s prediction that if Elizabeth Warren is 
the Democratic nominee, she has a fifty-five percent chance of 
winning the election.9 
 
(observing that special interests can threaten to overshadow other goals); Richard G. 
Newell, The Role of Energy Technology Policy Alongside Carbon Pricing, in 
IMPLEMENTING A US CARBON TAX: CHALLENGES AND DEBATES 178, 188 (Ian Parry et al. 
eds., 2015). 
 7 Georgios Tziralis & Ilias Tatsiopoulos, Prediction Markets: An Extended 
Literature Review, 1 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.1, 2007, at 75, 75 (2007). For reviews of 
the academic literature on prediction markets, see generally id. and Christian F. Horn 
et al., Prediction Markets - A Literature Review 2014 Following Tziralis and Tatsiopoulos, 
8 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.2, 2014, at 89, 89.  
 8 See generally Joyce E. Berg & Thomas A. Rietz, Prediction Markets as Decision 
Support Systems, 5 INFO. SYS. FRONTIERS 79 (2003) (detailing how prediction markets 
use information to make predictions in a variety of contexts, including the 1996 
presidential election).  
 9 Since the contract pays $1 if Elizabeth Warren wins, then a price of $0.55 
implies that the market gives Warren a fifty-five percent chance of winning if she is 
the Democratic nominee. See Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Interpreting Prediction 
Market Prices as Probabilities 8-12 (Inst. for Study of Labor (IZA) Discussion Papers, 
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We propose that policymakers sponsor similar markets for 
predicting the success of climate policies conditioned on the adoption 
of those policies. The government could, for example, use prediction 
markets to forecast whether subsidizing research to develop a more 
efficient gasoline engine would reduce carbon emissions in the 
transportation sector. The market operator could issue a prediction 
market contract that would pay $1 for each 100 million metric tons of 
carbon emissions from the transportation sector in the year 2030. If 
such a contract were selling for $20, its price would imply a forecast of 
two billion metric tons. One version of the contract would be 
conditioned on the government funding gasoline engine research and 
another on the government not funding the research. The difference in 
price would forecast the effect of the subsidy. 
Prediction markets have been shown to outperform other 
forecasting mechanisms in a wide range of contexts — from predicting 
election outcomes and economic trends to guessing Oscar winners.10 
Against this background, recent scholarship argues that prediction 
markets could predict future temperature levels and help resolve the 
debate over whether global warming is really a problem.11 Going one 
step further, this Article explores the potential of conditional 
prediction markets to forecast the effectiveness of competing climate 
policy proposals and to assist policymakers with their selection, 
design, and implementation.12 
 
no. 2092, 2006) (Ger.).  
 10 See infra Part I.C.2.  
 11 See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U. COLO. L. REV. 
179, 205-06 (2011); Shi-Ling Hsu, Climate Change Regulation and Prediction Markets, 
REG., Summer 2014, at 36-37 (2014); Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Energy and 
Climate Change: A Climate Prediction Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1962, 1966 (2014); see 
also Elmira Aliakbari & Ross McKitrick, Information Aggregation in a Prediction 
Market for Climate Outcomes 29-30 (Feb. 3, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file 
with the University of Guelph) (Can.). Another recent paper explores whether 
prediction markets might generate a consensus on the factors that cause climate 
change. John J. Nay et al., Betting and Belief: Prediction Markets and Attribution of 
Climate Change, in IEEE PROCEEDINGS OF THE 2016 WINTER SIMULATION CONFERENCE 
1666, 1666 (T.M.K. Roeder et al. eds., 2016).  
 12 The work closest to our own is an article by Scott Sumner and Aaron Jackson in 
which they proposed a set of prediction markets designed to forecast global 
temperature and greenhouse gas levels, and they briefly discussed in general terms 
how those markets might assist policymakers and help shape policy. Scott Sumner & 
Aaron L. Jackson, Using Prediction Markets to Guide Global Warming Policy §§ 4-5 
(Dec. 9, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.econmodels.com/upload7282/ 
efae68d98251d757b48dfaef0295c28e.pdf. Similarly, Sebastian Goers and his 
colleagues have suggested that prediction markets might help policymakers predict if 
and when certain environmentally friendly technologies will be invented. Sebastian R. 
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Part I makes the case that prediction markets have the potential to 
significantly improve upon the decision-making procedures of 
traditional legal institutions. Drawing on the literature on government 
failure, we examine specific reasons why policymakers and regulators 
sometimes act contrary to the public interest, including information 
deficits, cognitive and emotional biases, and special interest influence. 
We also survey existing mechanisms for addressing these problems, 
such as cost-benefit analysis and expert deliberation, and discuss their 
limitations. We then lay out the potential of prediction markets to 
improve government decision making through more reliable and 
transparent forecasts that aggregate widely dispersed information in an 
unbiased way untainted by interest group politics. 
Part II argues that the government should use prediction markets to 
better allocate green subsidies to promote clean technology 
innovation. In the short term, we advocate for incremental changes to 
the process by which grant-making agencies fund clean-technology 
research. The Department of Energy’s Advanced Research Project 
Agency-Energy program (“ARPA-E”), for example, could immediately 
incorporate prediction markets into its project-funding decisions 
without the need for congressional action. Smaller-scale 
experimentation with prediction markets by ARPA-E would allow for 
the development of an empirical track record of prediction market 
performance in federal agencies. Once prediction markets prove 
themselves, more radical reforms could include the use of these 
markets by Congress in allocating larger sums of money. 
Moving from the federal to the state level, Part III discusses ways in 
which states could incorporate prediction markets to improve their 
climate and energy policies. Without a coherent federal policy strategy 
to address climate change and promote clean energy, states have 
emerged as key drivers of climate change mitigation and clean energy 
innovation.13 With a veritable potpourri of policies in place, states are 
 
Goers et al., New and Old Market-Based Instruments for Climate Change Policy, 12 
ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y STUD. 1, 23-26 (2010).  
 13 Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1625-26, 1629-
30 (2015) [hereinafter Clean Energy Federalism] (exploring the ideal institutional level 
of implementation for select climate and clean energy policies); Felix Mormann, 
Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for State Climate Policy 
Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 190-91 (2017) [hereinafter Constitutional 
Challenges] (discussing constitutional limitations on the freedom of states to adopt 
effective climate and clean energy policies). For an overview of state climate policy 
actions, see Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local 
Climate Change Initiatives, 2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 123-24 (2008); Daniel A. 
Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 883-92 
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living up to the Brandeisian ideal of “laboratories of democracy.”14 But 
which policies best tackle the daunting challenges presented by 
climate change? Prediction markets have the potential to shed light on 
this critical question as well as increase the benefits and reduce the 
risks inherent in state climate policy experimentation. 
I. HOW TRADITIONAL LEGAL INSTITUTIONS CAN BENEFIT FROM 
PREDICTION MARKETS 
This Part discusses reasons why policymakers may sometimes adopt 
ineffective or inefficient policies and explains some of the problems 
that plague existing legal institutions. We then discuss the potential 
for prediction markets to address these problems. 
A. Why Legislatures Sometimes Adopt Bad Laws 
Voters likely have at least some influence over public policy.15 As a 
result, understanding legislative decision making starts with 
understanding voter behavior. The notion that politicians respond to 
voters’ policy preferences may seem like welcome news in a 
democracy. The ideal of democratically legitimized policy choices, 
however, ignores the reality that many voters are woefully ignorant 
about politics and policy.16 Moreover, voters often suffer from 
cognitive and emotional biases that lead them to support or oppose 
particular policies even though they might not do so if they were fully 
informed and unbiased.17 
That voters’ policy preferences are often biased and uninformed 
should come as no surprise. Public policy is complex, a single vote is 
rarely decisive,18 and most of the consequences of bad policies fall on 
 
(2008); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: 
Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 681, 683-88 (2008).  
 14 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  
 15 See JAMES A. STIMSON, TIDES OF CONSENT: HOW PUBLIC OPINION SHAPES AMERICAN 
POLITICS xvi (2004); Paul Burstein, The Impact of Public Opinion on Public Policy: A 
Review and an Agenda, 56 POL. RES. Q. 29, 36 (2003); Brandice Canes-Wrone et al., Out 
of Step, Out of Office: Electoral Accountability and House Members’ Voting, 96 AM. POL. 
SCI. REV. 127, 138 (2002).  
 16 See MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62-104 (1996); ILYA SOMIN, DEMOCRACY AND POLITICAL 
IGNORANCE: WHY SMALLER GOVERNMENT IS SMARTER 17-61 (2013).  
 17 For a review of the literature on voter biases, see generally Gary M. Lucas, Jr., & 
Slavisa Tasic, Behavioral Public Choice and the Law, 118 W. VA. L. REV. 199 (2015). 
 18 DENNIS C. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE III 304-05 (2003); see also Jonathan R. 
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others.19 As a result, individual voters have little incentive to seek out 
all relevant information. Moreover, unbiased thinking requires 
significant effort and our minds are usually lazy.20 When people are 
uninformed and lack motivation, they often analyze complex 
problems superficially by invoking simple cues and decision heuristics 
that can result in errors.21 For example, voters sometimes invoke the 
availability heuristic — a tendency to estimate the importance and 
frequency of an event based upon how easy it is to recall examples of 
it — leading them to prioritize threats that are familiar, salient, and 
accompanied by vivid news images (e.g., terrorism), over those that 
are not (e.g., climate change).22 
When it comes to climate policy, the public’s views on particular 
policy instruments often contradict expert opinion in ways that are 
hard to explain without resorting to psychology. For instance, voters 
strongly support command-and-control regulations and green 
subsidies, which many economists condemn as inefficient, yet voters 
steadfastly oppose a carbon tax, which experts maintain would reduce 
carbon emissions at a much lower cost.23 One possible explanation for 
the difference between expert and voter opinion is that voters engage 
in a sort of intuitive cost-benefit analysis that is biased against a 
carbon tax because, relative to alternative policies, the costs of the tax 
are more salient while the benefits are less so.24 
While voter bias and ignorance present significant hurdles to 
effective climate policy, politicians probably have some slack to ignore 
voters’ wishes and implement their own agenda. Perhaps voters simply 
fail to pay attention or they are subject to partisan bias and dutifully 
support the politicians currently in control of their favored party even 
if this means modifying their own policy views.25 In theory, politicians 
 
Macey, Public Choice: The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of Market Exchange, 74 
CORNELL L. REV. 43, 46-51 (1988) (discussing the groups likely to drive legislation). 
For an assessment of conventional public choice narrative in an environmental policy 
context, see Richard L. Revesz, Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public 
Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 559-71 (2001).  
 19 See Bryan Caplan, Majorities Against Utility: Implications of the Failure of the 
Miracle of Aggregation, 26 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 198, 207-08 (2008). 
 20 See DANIEL KAHNEMAN, THINKING, FAST AND SLOW 39-49 (2011). 
 21 See THOMAS GILOVICH ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 281-86 (3d ed. 2013). 
 22 Cass R, Sunstein, The Availability Heuristic, Intuitive Cost-Benefit Analysis, and 
Climate Change, 77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 195, 200-03 (2006). 
 23 Gary M. Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology and the Carbon Tax, 90 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 11-
13 (2017). 
 24 Id. at 22.  
 25 See CHRISTOPHER H. ACHEN & LARRY M. BARTELS, DEMOCRACY FOR REALISTS: WHY 
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could use the slack that they possess to promote the public interest, 
correcting for voter biases. Unfortunately, politicians may be self-
interested,26 beholden to special interest groups,27 hampered by a lack 
of information and policy expertise,28 and subject to the same biases 
that plague voters.29 
Not surprisingly then, it is easy to identify climate and 
environmental legislation that is inefficient and, in some cases, even 
counterproductive.30 For example, subsidies for ethanol, which are 
backed by politicians and voters alike, have cost billions of tax dollars 
while producing little, if any, environmental benefit.31 This and other 
examples of bad environmental legislation motivate the search for 
decision-making mechanisms that will improve public policy. 
B. Why Administrative Agencies Make Mistakes 
Given the problems with legislative decision making, delegating 
climate policy to administrative agencies seems appealing. Bureaucrats 
are arguably more insulated than legislators from public pressure and 
interest group lobbying, and their narrow jurisdictional focus allows 
them to develop greater technical expertise specific to their field.32 Yet, 
there are many reasons why even agencies may make significant 
mistakes. 
First, while bureaucrats have some slack to ignore the preferences of 
voters and politicians, politicians have various means for keeping 
agencies in line, including control over agency budgets and staffing 
 
ELECTIONS DO NOT PRODUCE RESPONSIVE GOVERNMENT 309-10 (Tali Mendelberg ed., 
2016). 
 26 See James M. Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical 
Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, in 3 THE COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES 
BUCHANAN 1, 18-30 (1999). 
 27 MUELLER, supra note 18, at 475-76, 489-90, 493-94 (analyzing the theory that 
interest groups affect legislators’ votes).  
 28 See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN & WILLIAM T. HASSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR: OR 
HOW THE CLEAN AIR ACT BECAME A MULTIBILLION-DOLLAR BAIL-OUT FOR HIGH-SULFUR 
COAL PRODUCERS AND WHAT SHOULD BE DONE ABOUT IT 26-29 (1981).  
 29 Lucas & Tasic, supra note 17, at 214-15.  
 30 See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HASSLER, supra note 28, at 2; GRAETZ, supra note 6; NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, EFFECTS OF U.S. TAX POLICY ON GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS 3-7 
(William Nordhaus et al. eds., 2013) [hereinafter TAX POLICY].  
 31 Robert Hahn & Caroline Cecot, The Benefits and Costs of Ethanol: An Evaluation 
of the Government’s Analysis, 35 J. REG. ECON. 275, 275-80, 283-285 (2009); see NAT’L 
RESEARCH COUNCIL, TAX POLICY, supra note 30, at 97-102. 
 32 JOHN F. MANNING & MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON, LEGISLATION AND REGULATION 
351-55 (2d ed. 2013) (reviewing the literature on this point). 
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decisions.33 Consequently, agency decision making is not immune to 
the biases of voters and politicians or to political corruption.34 Second, 
bureaucrats may themselves be captured by special interest groups.35 
The mechanisms of regulatory capture include “cultural capture,” in 
which regulatory actions serve the ends of a special interest group 
because bureaucrats have come to identify members of that group as 
part of their own in-group and have formed close relationships with 
them, perhaps as a result of the revolving door between industry and 
government.36 Third, some bureaucrats may be less concerned about 
the public interest than they are about career advancement and 
protecting their own jobs, salaries, and reputations, or about 
maximizing the power and budgets of the agencies for which they 
work.37 Fourth, like voters and politicians, bureaucrats may suffer 
 
 33 Id. at 406-544; see Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 
2245, 2298 (2001); Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as 
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246-47, 273-74 (1987); 
Matthew D. McCubbins et al., Structure and Process, Politics and Policy: Administrative 
Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431, 440-44, 468-82 
(1989).  
 34 See SOMIN, supra note 16, at 184 (arguing that voter ignorance and irrationality 
are “likely to reduce the quality of any delegations to experts that are enacted into 
law”). For examples of how political pressure has influenced agency decision making 
in the environmental context, see Robert R. Kuehn, Bias in Environmental Agency 
Decision Making, 45 ENVTL. L. 957, 959-61 (2015). For a famous case study 
demonstrating how political pressure undermined automobile safety regulation and 
encouraged an aggressive focus on recalling defective automobiles that likely 
contributed little to vehicle safety, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Law and Engineering: In Search 
of the Law-Science Problem, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 135, 141-44 (2003); see also 
Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Inside the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration: Legal Determinants of Bureaucratic Organization and Performance, 57 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 443, 465, 478-79 (1990). For a discussion of how industry threats might 
persuade bureaucrats to act against the public interest, see Sanford C. Gordon & 
Catherine Hafer, Flexing Muscle: Corporate Political Expenditures as Signals to the 
Bureaucracy, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 245, 258 (2005). A related concern arises if 
bureaucrats know that their mistakes will come to light if they harm an industry 
group, but not if they harm the public interest. See Clare Leaver, Bureaucratic Minimal 
Squawk Behavior: Theory and Evidence from Regulatory Agencies, 99 AM. ECON. REV. 
572, 573-74 (2009).  
 35 For a compilation of recent contributions to the regulatory capture literature, 
see generally PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW 
TO LIMIT IT (Daniel Carpenter & David A. Moss eds., 2014) [hereinafter PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE]. For examples of regulatory capture in the environmental 
context, see Kuehn, supra note 34, at 958-60.  
 36 James Kwak, Cultural Capture and the Financial Crisis, in PREVENTING 
REGULATORY CAPTURE supra note 35, at 71, 79-98. 
 37 For a discussion of several models of bureaucratic behavior, see MUELLER, supra 
note 18, at 359-85. 
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from cognitive and emotional biases, including ideological bias, 
overconfidence in their ability to create welfare-improving regulations, 
and tunnel vision, or the tendency to focus excessively on their 
agency’s narrowly defined mission while ignoring competing 
concerns.38 Finally, when relevant information is broadly dispersed, 
individual bureaucrats may not know enough to decide wisely. A 
notorious example of this phenomenon was the consistent failure of 
central planners in the Soviet Union to properly allocate goods and 
resources due to lack of information about what was needed when and 
where.39 
While these problems with agency decision making are troubling 
and potentially significant, various administrative procedures seek to 
address them. The notice-and-comment rulemaking process40 and 
centralized review of agency rules by the Office of Information and 
Regulatory Affairs41 aim to promote transparency and accountability, 
help agencies gather dispersed information, and counteract biases 
such as tunnel vision. As a last resort, courts can strike down 
regulations that they deem arbitrary.42 While helpful, these procedural 
safeguards are no panacea.43 
Four mechanisms designed to promote better bureaucratic decisions 
are worth discussing in detail. As we will show, group deliberation, 
peer review, cost-benefit analysis, and expert surveys can help 
policymakers, but also introduce significant concerns of their own. As 
a result, these decision-making mechanisms can potentially be 
replaced or improved upon by prediction markets. 
As with prediction markets, the goal of group deliberation is to 
aggregate dispersed information as well as mitigate individual biases. 
The literature on group decision making, however, shows that 
deliberating groups suffer from four major flaws.44 First, they often 
amplify the biases and errors of individual group members. Second, 
 
 38 Lucas & Tasic, supra note 17, at 252-57. 
 39 See Richard E. Ericson, The Classical Soviet-Type Economy: Nature of the System 
and Implications for Reform, 5 J. ECON. PERSP. 11, 15-25 (1991). 
 40 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2018).  
 41 For a discussion of how the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs 
operates, see generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN, VALUING LIFE: HUMANIZING THE REGULATORY 
STATE 11-46 (2014). 
 42 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2018). 
 43 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the 
Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1263-1311 (2006); Stephen J. Choi & A.C. 
Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1, 36-40 (2003). 
 44 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA: HOW MANY MINDS PRODUCE KNOWLEDGE 75 (2006) 
[hereinafter INFOTOPIA]. 
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they frequently fail to elicit all relevant information from members, 
giving too much weight to information possessed by all members and 
too little weight to information known to only a few. Third, they are 
prone to informational and reputational cascades whereby group 
members conceal their doubts (and the information prompting them) 
about the group’s decision out of deference to the majority or for fear 
of reputational harm. Finally, they often produce group polarization, 
which occurs when group members initially lean in a particular 
direction (e.g., favoring the death penalty) and deliberation pushes 
them further in that direction because arguments favoring that 
position are more likely to be mentioned and social pressure yields 
conformity. As a result, deliberating groups are especially likely to 
make bad decisions when a large proportion of group members are 
biased, important information is known to only a few members who 
remain silent, and the group is highly cohesive so that members feel 
intense pressure to conform and to reject the views of outsiders.45 
Peer review is a procedure frequently employed by government 
agencies in the selection process for research grants. Despite peer 
review’s status among scientists as a venerable institution, evidence of 
its effectiveness is mixed. On one hand, a recent study of grants made 
by the National Institutes of Health found a “one-standard deviation 
worse peer-review score among awarded grants [to be] associated with 
15% fewer citations, 7% fewer publications, 19% fewer high-impact 
publications, and 14% fewer follow-on patents,” even after controlling 
for various characteristics of the grant recipient.46 These numbers 
suggest that peer review can help effectively allocate grant money to 
those researchers whose work will have the greatest impact. On the 
other hand, another recent study found evidence of significant bias in 
peer review and in particular that “evaluators systematically give lower 
scores to research proposals that are closer to their own areas of 
expertise and to those that are highly novel.”47 Beyond the grant 
selection process, numerous scholars have documented problems with 
peer review as part of the article selection process for academic 
 
 45 Id. at 75-102. 
 46 Danielle Li & Leila Agha, Big Names or Big Ideas: Do Peer-Review Panels Select 
the Best Science Proposals?, 348 SCI. 434, 434 (2015). 
 47 Kevin J. Boudreau et al., Looking Across and Looking Beyond the Knowledge 
Frontier: Intellectual Distance, Novelty, and Resource Allocation in Science, 62 MGMT. 
SCI. 2765, 2765 (2016); see also Thomas O. McGarity, Peer Review in Awarding Federal 
Grants in the Arts and Sciences, 9 HIGH TECH. L.J. 1, 38-55 (1994) (discussing possible 
biases in the peer review process). 
  
2019] Betting on Climate Policy 1441 
journals.48 The primary lesson of this literature is that peer review 
likely has some value, but also suffers from significant drawbacks, 
particularly when it comes to evaluating highly innovative ideas. 
Cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) is a well-established feature of agency 
decision making and is generally required for any significant 
regulatory action at the federal level.49 CBA can facilitate transparency 
and accountability50 as well as correct various biases (cognitive or 
otherwise) by forcing bureaucrats to carefully consider the likely 
consequences of proposed regulations.51 Nevertheless, CBA is 
controversial in part because it requires estimating future costs and 
benefits that may be very difficult to forecast.52 Moreover, the 
government often fails to conduct CBA properly in compliance with 
guidelines suggested by regulatory experts or the Office of 
Management and Budget.53 
Finally, expert surveys seek to leverage the knowledge and 
experience of the brightest minds in a given field. The problem with 
expert surveys, however, is that experts may be unreliable, particularly 
given their lack of incentive for accuracy. When it comes to 
forecasting, experts often make poor predictions.54 Moreover, experts 
may be corrupt or perceived as such,55 tell people what they want to 
 
 48 E.g., DAVID SHATZ, PEER REVIEW: A CRITICAL INQUIRY 35-108 (2004); Juan Miguel 
Campanario, Peer Review for Journals as It Stands Today: Part 1, 19 SCI. COMM. 181, 
191-203 (1998); Juan Miguel Campanario, Peer Review for Journals as It Stands Today: 
Part 2, 19 SCI. COMM. 277, 280-82 (1998); Peter M. Rothwell & Christopher N. 
Martyn, Reproducibility of Peer Review in Clinical Neuroscience: Is Agreement Between 
Reviewers Any Greater than Would Be Expected by Chance Alone?, 123 BRAIN 1964, 
1966-68 (2000).  
 49 For a discussion of this requirement, see MANNING & STEPHENSON, supra note 
32, at 513-32. 
 50 See Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis: A Positive 
Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1137, 1140-41 (2001). 
 51 See generally Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 1059 (2000). 
 52 See Amy Sinden, Cost-Benefit Analysis, in DECISION MAKING IN ENVIRONMENTAL 
LAW 295, 304-05 (LeRoy C. Paddock et al. eds., 2016).  
 53 Robert W. Hahn, An Evaluation of Government Efforts to Improve Regulatory 
Decision Making, 3 INT’L REV. ENVTL. & RESOURCE ECON. 245, 258-59 (2009).  
 54 See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT: HOW GOOD IS IT? HOW CAN 
WE KNOW? 25-66 (2005) (presenting substantial evidence that dilettantes and simple 
algorithms often beat expert forecasts). 
 55 See, e.g., Robin Cooper Feldman et al., Open Letter on Ethical Norms in 
Intellectual Property Scholarship, 29 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 339, 340 (2016); Eric Lipton et 
al., Think Tank Scholar or Corporate Consultant? It Depends on the Day, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/09/us/politics/think-tank-scholars-
corporate-consultants.html; Brody Mullins & Jack Nicas, Paying Professors: Inside 
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hear even if it is not true,56 herd with other experts to protect their 
professional reputations,57 and fall victim to the subtle biases present 
within their field.58 
C. Prediction Markets: A Catalyst for Better Legislative and Agency 
Decision Making 
This section argues that prediction markets have the potential to 
improve climate policy by addressing some of the problems with 
existing legal institutions and processes outlined above. We begin by 
surveying the theory and evidence that prediction markets improve on 
other forecasting techniques. We then explain features beyond mere 
forecast accuracy that should make prediction markets attractive to 
policymakers. 
1. More Accurate Forecasts: Theory 
Economists have long recognized the power of prices to convey 
information.59 As applied to prediction markets, rational expectations 
theory60 and the strong form of the efficient markets hypothesis61 
imply that prediction markets accurately forecast future events 
because the marginal trader in the market has unbiased expectations 
and market prices incorporate all relevant information, making it 
 
Google’s Academic Influence Campaign, WALL ST. J. (July 14, 2017, 9:14 AM ET), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/paying-professors-inside-googles-academic-influence-
campaign-1499785286.  
 56 See Canice Prendergast, A Theory of “Yes Men,” 83 AM. ECON. REV. 757, 757-59 
(1993). 
 57 See David S. Scharfstein & Jeremy C. Stein, Herd Behavior and Investment, 80 
AM. ECON. REV. 465, 465-67 (1990). 
 58 See, e.g., Robyn M. Dawes et al., Clinical Versus Actuarial Judgment, 243 SCI. 
1668, 1671-73 (1989) (discussing biases to which psychologists are subject); Lee 
Jussim et al., Ideological Bias in Social Psychological Research, in SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
AND POLITICS 91, 98-105 (Joseph P. Forgas et al. eds., 2015) (presenting evidence of 
ideological bias in social psychology); Luigi Zingales, Preventing Economists’ Capture, 
in PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE, supra note 35, at 124, 130-44 (providing evidence 
of bias among economists and discussing the mechanisms contributing to it).  
 59 See, e.g., F.A. Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 5, 
12-13 (2005) (This article was originally published by The American Economic Review 
in 1945.). 
 60 See generally SANFORD J. GROSSMAN, THE INFORMATIONAL ROLE OF PRICES 11-40 
(1989); STEVEN M. SHEFFRIN, RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS (2d ed. 1996).  
 61 See generally Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, 46 J. FIN. 1575, 1577, 
1603-08 (1991); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and 
Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 409-13 (1970).  
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impossible to improve upon the predictions implied by those prices.62 
Even if real-world prediction markets are less than perfectly efficient,63 
there are reasons to believe that they will often outperform other 
forecasting techniques, including forecasting by means of expert 
surveys or group deliberation. 
First, prediction markets that are open to a large group of traders 
aggregate information that is widely dispersed.64 Such “markets 
provide a centralized locus for information aggregation” so that 
anyone with relevant information knows where to go to disclose it and 
how.65 Moreover, “the market provides an algorithm for aggregating 
opinions.”66 Unlike group deliberation, which often adheres to the 
“principle of ‘one person, one vote,’” prediction markets allow traders 
to register their confidence in their views by increasing the amount 
wagered.67 In addition, anyone with relevant information can 
participate regardless of social or professional status.68 Relatedly, if the 
 
 62 See John O. Ledyard, Designing Information Markets for Policy Analysis, in 
INFORMATION MARKETS: A NEW WAY OF MAKING DECISIONS 37, 41-42 (Robert W. Hahn 
& Paul C. Tetlock eds., 2006); Justin Wolfers & Eric Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, 18 
J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 2004, at 107, 108 [hereinafter Prediction Markets].  
 63 The stock market provides evidence that speculative markets can be efficient. 
See generally Mark Rubinstein, Rational Markets: Yes or No? The Affirmative Case, 57 
FIN. ANALYSTS J., May-June 2001, at 15 (presenting evidence that index funds, which 
are speculative in nature, consistently outperform actively managed mutual funds). 
Moreover, “betting markets have offered support in favor of the efficient markets 
hypothesis, especially in the market for all games in a given sport over a long time 
horizon.” Rodney J. Paul & Andrew P. Weinbach, Uses of Sports Wagering-Based 
Prediction Markets Outside of the World of Gambling, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY 
AND APPLICATIONS 157, 157 (Leighton Vaughan Williams ed., 2011); cf. Anastasios 
Oikonomidis & Johnnie Johnson, Who Can Beat the Odds? The Case of Football Betting 
Reviewed, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra, at 204, 206-08, 
217 (reviewing the literature on the efficiency of soccer betting markets and 
concluding that “even though opportunities for profit theoretically exist, only the 
fastest, most efficient and highly determined players are likely to convert theory to 
practice and benefit from inefficient pricing in the football betting market”). For 
evidence that prediction markets are not perfectly efficient, see Joyce E. Berg & 
Thomas A. Rietz, Longshots, Overconfidence and Efficiency on the Iowa Electronic 
Market 17-27 (Sept. 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1645062. For similar evidence related to experimental 
prediction markets, see Charles Noussair, Experimental Prediction and Pari-Mutuel 
Betting Markets, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra, at 174, 180-82.  
 64 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121.  
 65 M. Todd Henderson et al., Predicting Crime, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 15, 23-24 (2010). 
 66 Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121 (emphasis 
omitted). 
 67 SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 130-31.  
 68 Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 21.  
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opinions of traders are sufficiently diverse, prediction markets can 
take advantage of the wisdom of crowds, a phenomenon whereby 
forecasting errors by individuals tend to cancel each other out in the 
aggregate so that the resulting group forecast is more accurate than 
individual forecasts.69 
Second, in contrast to group deliberation, prediction markets create 
an incentive for people to reveal policy-relevant information that they 
might otherwise fail to disclose.70 Specifically, traders who have 
information suggesting that the market price is wrong can profit by 
trading on that information, thereby moving the market toward the 
efficient price.71 
Third, prediction markets create an incentive for more and better 
research because traders with better information have an advantage in 
the market.72 When expert forecasts disagree with the market price, 
experts can either bet on their models or revisit their assumptions to 
try to ascertain the source of the disagreement.73 
Fourth, relative to other forecasting mechanisms, prediction 
markets may better evaluate information and more quickly 
incorporate new data.74 As mentioned above, traders who are more 
certain about the quality of their information can register their 
conviction by betting more money.75 Conversely, traders who are 
wrong lose money, so uninformed people have an incentive to stay out 
of the market. This feature distinguishes prediction markets from 
group deliberation, a setting in which talk is cheap and participants 
are not forced to put their money where their mouths are. 
Finally, prediction markets create incentives to avoid biases in 
forecasting, whether cognitive, emotional, reputational, or financial. A 
strong body of evidence suggests that better incentives can reduce 
bias, especially cognitive and emotional bias, and improve decision 
 
 69 For a review of the literature on the wisdom of crowds, see Joseph P. Simmons 
et al., Intuitive Biases in Choice Versus Estimation: Implications for the Wisdom of 
Crowds, 38 J. CONSUMER RES. 1, 1-2 (2011). The authors note that under the wisdom 
of crowds theory a crowd’s judgment is most likely to be accurate “when the crowds’ 
judges are (1) knowledgeable, (2) motivated to be accurate, (3) independent, and (4) 
diverse.” Id. at 2.  
 70 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121.  
 71 For evidence that prediction markets are generally efficient in the sense of 
allowing few opportunities for arbitrage, see id. at 116-19.  
 72 Id. at 121.  
 73 Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 24. 
 74 See Oleg Bondarenko & Peter Bossaerts, Expectations and Learning in Iowa, 24 J. 
BANKING & FIN. 1535, 1545-50 (2000). 
 75 Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 23. 
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making.76 With their promise of monetary reward, prediction markets 
provide strong incentives for unbiased forecasting. Similarly, the 
ability of traders to participate anonymously in prediction markets 
eliminates the risk of reputational damage that comes with sharing 
information as part of a deliberating group.77 Importantly, a prediction 
market can function well even if many traders within the market are 
biased, as long as the marginal trader — the one who sets the market 
clearing price — is not.78 
2. More Accurate Forecasts: Empirical Evidence 
As compelling as the theoretical case for prediction markets is, the 
primary reason to believe that they can be useful to policymakers is 
their strong track record of forecast accuracy. Over several decades 
and across various domains, speculative markets, including prediction 
markets, have fared well relative to expert predictions and other 
forecasting mechanisms. Moreover, unlike algorithms, which are often 
highly specific to a given field, prediction markets are versatile enough 
to deliver forecasts in a variety of policy-relevant contexts. 
To illustrate, consider the following summary of the empirical 
evidence. Prediction markets generally outperform polls in predicting 
election outcomes.79 Horse race bettors beat horse race experts.80 
Economic derivatives markets beat the average forecast of a panel of 
 
 76 See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, Economic Incentives Transform 
Psychological Anomalies, 23 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 215, 225-26, 229-30 (1994) 
(explaining that the frequency and magnitude of bias or irrational behavior lessen 
when incentives are introduced); Erik Hoelzl & Aldo Rustichini, Overconfident: Do 
You Put Your Money on It?, 115 ECON. J. 305, 315-17 (2005) (summarizing results 
suggesting subjects’ overconfidence bias may be reduced when money is at stake); 
Jonathan Klick & Gregory Mitchell, Government Regulation of Irrationality: Moral and 
Cognitive Hazards, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1620, 1633-36 (2006) (discussing incentives’ 
“role in the quality of judgment and choice”); cf. Colin F. Camerer & Robin M. 
Hogarth, The Effects of Financial Incentives in Experiments: A Review and Capital-Labor-
Production Framework, 19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7, 34-36 (1999) (explaining that 
sometimes incentives improve performance but often they do not).  
 77 SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 104-05.  
 78 See Adam Mann, Market Forecasts, 538 NATURE 308, 310 (2016).  
 79 E.g., Joyce E. Berg et al., Prediction Market Accuracy in the Long Run, 24 INT’L. J. 
FORECASTING 285, 286 (2008); Joyce Berg et al., Results from a Dozen Years of Election 
Futures Markets Research, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 742, 
746-48 (Charles R. Plott & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2008) [hereinafter Results]; Wolfers 
& Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 112.  
 80 See Stephen Figlewski, Subjective Information and Market Efficiency in a Betting 
Market, 87 J. POL. ECON. 75, 82-87 (1979). 
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experts in predicting economic outcomes.81 Orange juice futures 
improve upon weather forecasts.82 Stock prices identified the firm 
whose defective part caused the Challenger space shuttle crash well 
before the official investigation concluded.83 Numerous companies 
have found that their internal prediction markets outperform expert 
forecasts in predicting product sales volume.84 Furthermore, 
prediction markets have succeeded in forecasting the outcomes of 
sporting events,85 movie box office receipts,86 Oscar winners,87 
Google’s market capitalization prior to its initial public offering,88 a 
company’s ability to meet project deadlines,89 the reproducibility of 
published scientific research results,90 and flu outbreaks.91 Finally, in 
experiments designed to test their performance and limitations, “[t]he 
data give an encouraging, though qualified, picture of prediction 
 
 81 See Refet S. Gürkaynak & Justin Wolfers, Macroeconomic Derivatives: An Initial 
Analysis of Market-Based Macro Forecasts, Uncertainty, and Risk, in NBER 
INTERNATIONAL SEMINAR ON MACROECONOMICS 2005, at 11, 15-20 (Jeffrey A. Frankel & 
Christopher A. Pissarides eds., 2007).  
 82 See Richard Roll, Orange Juice and Weather, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 861, 868-73 
(1984).  
 83 Michael T. Maloney & J. Harold Mulherin, The Complexity of Price Discovery in 
an Efficient Market: The Stock Market Reaction to the Challenger Crash, 9 J. CORP. FIN. 
453, 453, 473-74 (2003). 
 84 E.g., Bo Cowgill & Eric Zitzewitz, Corporate Prediction Markets: Evidence from 
Google, Ford, and Firm X, 82 REV. ECON. STUD. 1309, 1310, 1337 (2015); Emile 
Servan-Schreiber, Prediction Markets: Trading Uncertainty for Collective Wisdom, in 
COLLECTIVE WISDOM: PRINCIPLES AND MECHANISMS 21, 29 (Hélène Landemore & Jon 
Elster eds., 2012); Charles R. Plott & Kay-Yut Chen, Information Aggregation 
Mechanisms: Concept, Design and Implementation for a Sales Forecasting Problem 13-14 
(Cal. Inst. Tech. Soc. Sci., Working Paper No. 1131, 2002) (Hewlett-Packard). For a 
detailed review of the use of prediction markets by private firms, see DONALD N. 
THOMPSON, ORACLES: HOW PREDICTION MARKETS TURN EMPLOYEES INTO VISIONARIES 3-
130 (2012).  
 85 See, e.g., Emile Servan-Schreiber et al., Prediction Markets: Does Money Matter?, 
14 ELECTRONIC MKTS. 243, 250 (2004).  
 86 See, e.g., Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 113-14.  
 87 See, e.g., Deepak Pathak et al., A Comparison of Forecasting Methods: 
Fundamentals, Polling, Prediction Markets, and Experts, 9 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no. 2, 
2015, at 1, 23-25.  
 88 See Joyce E. Berg et al., Searching for Google’s Value: Using Prediction Markets to 
Forecast Market Capitalization Prior to an Initial Public Offering, 55 MGMT. SCI. 348, 
349 (2009).  
 89 See SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 116-17.  
 90 See Anna Dreber et al., Using Prediction Markets to Estimate the Reproducibility of 
Scientific Research, 112 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 15343, 15343-45 (2015).  
 91 See Philip M. Polgreen et al., Using Prediction Markets to Forecast Trends in 
Infectious Diseases, 1 MICROBE 459, 463-64 (2006).  
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market performance” suggesting that prediction markets are “typically 
beneficial.”92 
While harnessing the full power of prediction markets likely 
requires allowing bets for real money, empirical evidence suggests that 
even markets based on play money or prizes can be remarkably 
accurate.93 Private firms often use markets of this type to circumvent 
gambling restrictions, and many have found that the opportunity for 
bragging rights proves sufficient to motivate informed and unbiased 
trading.94 
Notwithstanding this impressive empirical record, we readily 
acknowledge that prediction markets have limitations and do not 
function as a crystal ball. Specifically, they can prove inaccurate when 
traders, even in the aggregate, do not have all the relevant information 
needed to make an accurate prediction. This could be because the 
relevant information is unknown or hard to piece together, in which 
case, other prediction mechanisms are also likely to perform poorly. 
Another possibility is that a small group of people have a monopoly on 
valuable information relevant to the market, but either they are not 
trading or the potential that they might trade drives others out of the 
market.95 This likely explains why prediction markets failed to predict 
that Iraq did not have weapons of mass destruction or that President 
Bush would appoint John Roberts to the Supreme Court.96 
Yet, the fact that prediction markets sometimes fail to accurately 
predict an event does not mean that they are hopelessly flawed or 
useless. As a case in point, consider the high-profile failure of 
prediction markets to forecast Donald Trump’s victory over Hillary 
Clinton in the 2016 presidential election. While it is true that the 
major prediction markets suggested that Trump had only between a 
 
 92 Noussair, supra note 63, at 185-86; see also Gerrit H. Van Bruggen et al., 
Prediction Markets as Institutional Forecasting Support Systems, 49 DECISION SUPPORT 
SYS. 404, 410-13 (2010) (presenting experimental evidence that prediction markets 
perform as well as or better than traditional forecasting mechanisms).  
 93 See e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 84, at 113, 115-16 (noting the “endowment 
effect” of play money); Sebastian Diemer & Joaquin Poblete, Real-Money vs. Play-
Money Forecasting Accuracy in Online Prediction Markets: Empirical Insights From 
iPredict, 4 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.3, 2010, at 21, 43; Servan-Schreiber et al., supra 
note 85, at 250.  
 94 See, e.g., THOMPSON, supra note 84, at 89-91 (noting that Google uses play 
money markets to avoid gambling restrictions); see Mann, supra note 78, at 310 
(noting “several studies have shown that traders can be equally well motivated by the 
prestige of being right”); Servan-Schreiber et al., supra note 85, at 244-45.  
 95 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121. 
 96 SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 134-36.  
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six percent and twenty-five percent chance of winning, it is also true 
that a small chance does not mean no chance. Moreover, Trump won 
by a thin margin. He lost the popular vote by nearly three million 
votes and narrowly won the electoral college thanks to razor-thin 
victories in Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin.97 Consequently, 
the popular notion that his victory was somehow inevitable is likely 
nothing more than hindsight bias. More importantly, in forecasting 
the election results, prediction markets generally did as well as or 
better than alternative approaches, including statistical poll 
aggregators.98 All the evidence suggests that the outcome of the 2016 
presidential election was very hard to predict. This raises an important 
point: even though prediction markets are imperfect, they can still be 
valuable as long as they perform well relative to other forecasting 
mechanisms.99 
3. Other Benefits of Prediction Markets 
In addition to improving forecasts, prediction markets possess other 
attractive features. First, they have the potential to provide 
policymakers with an easy-to-find, readily digestible, and highly 
reliable summary of complex information relevant to a particular 
policy, similar to the way in which stock prices summarize the value 
of firms.100 Second, “markets provide instantaneous and continuous 
feedback to information providers through prices,” ensuring that 
policymakers receive the most up-to-date information.101 Third, 
prediction markets have the potential to promote more effective 
policymaking by increasing transparency and combating the 
perception that government forecasts are biased or influenced by 
special interest groups.102 Moreover, if regulators choose to ignore 
 
 97 FED. ELECTION COMM’N, OFFICIAL 2016 PRESIDENTIAL GENERAL ELECTION RESULTS 
1-2, 6 (2017), https://transition.fec.gov/pubrec/fe2016/2016presgeresults.pdf; Philip 
Bump, Donald Trump Will Be President Thanks to 80,000 People in Three States, WASH. 
POST (Dec. 1, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/12/01/ 
donald-trump-will-be-president-thanks-to-80000-people-in-three-states/.  
 98 See Lumenogic, Did Donald Trump the Wisdom of Crowds?, HYPERMIND GAZETTE 
(Nov. 14, 2016), https://blog.hypermind.com/2016/11/14/donald-trumps-the-wisdom-
of-crowds/.  
 99 Robin Hanson, Shall We Vote on Values, but Bet on Beliefs?, 21 J. POL. PHIL. 151, 
155-56 (2013) [hereinafter Bet on Beliefs].  
 100 Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 23-24.  
 101 Id. at 24.  
 102 See Michael Abramowicz, Information Markets, Administrative Decisionmaking, 
and Predictive Cost-Benefit Analysis, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 933, 971 (2004) [hereinafter 
Information Markets]; Robert W. Hahn & Paul C. Tetlock, Using Information Markets 
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prediction market forecasts, the media, the public, and perhaps even 
the courts can hold them accountable by placing the burden on them 
to explain why.103 Finally, prediction markets offer special appeal to 
conservatives who tend to be deeply distrustful of government 
forecasts and the policymaking process. Market-oriented conservatives 
may trust prediction market forecasts more than those issued by 
bureaucrats, academics, and other experts whom they often associate 
— justly or not — with the Democratic party. 
II. PREDICTION MARKETS TO DIRECT GREEN SUBSIDIES 
As we mentioned at the outset, most policy experts argue that 
seriously addressing climate change will require placing a price on 
carbon, and many advocate for a carbon tax.104 If the government 
eventually adopts a carbon tax, the tax would yield considerable 
revenue, which raises the question of what to do with it. One option 
would be to use some substantial portion to fund green subsidies, 
including clean energy research and development. While a carbon tax 
remains widely unpopular, public support increases significantly when 
proposals stipulate that the government would use the resulting 
revenue to fund environmental programs.105 In addition, several 
prominent economists have argued that the government may be able 
to drastically reduce the overall cost of climate change mitigation by 
making a large investment in clean technology that pushes the 
economy away from fossil fuels toward clean energy.106 Remarkably, 
proposals for increased government spending to fund clean energy 
research have received support from climate and energy policy 
scholars across the political spectrum.107 In sum, green subsidies have 
broad appeal among both experts and the public. 
 
to Improve Public Decision Making, 29 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 213, 263-64 (2005).  
 103 Cf. Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 42 (“One benefit of this transparency is 
that it would encourage political accountability — politicians who opt to ignore the 
market would likely have to build a strong case for their position.”). 
 104 See supra note 1.  
 105 See Andrea Baranzini & Stefano Carattini, Effectiveness, Earmarking, and 
Labeling: Testing the Acceptability of Carbon Taxes with Survey Data, 19 ENVTL. ECON. 
& POL’Y STUD. 197, 211-13 (2017); Simon Dresner et al., Social and Political Responses 
to Ecological Tax Reform in Europe: An Introduction to the Special Issue, 34 ENERGY POL’Y 
895, 900-01 (2006); Steffen Kallbekken & Marianne Aasen, The Demand for 
Earmarking: Results from a Focus Group Study, 69 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 2183, 2187 
(2010). 
 106 See, e.g., PHILIPPE AGHION ET AL., CTR. FOR CHANGE ECON. & POL’Y, PATH 
DEPENDENCE, INNOVATION, AND THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 7 (2014).  
 107 See, e.g., STEVEN F. HAYWARD ET AL., POST-PARTISAN POWER: HOW A LIMITED AND 
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While green subsidies may sound good in theory, they could easily 
become a nightmare in practice. After all, the government has a mixed 
track record in choosing what technologies and activities to 
subsidize.108 Special interest influence is a major concern in this 
context. Dieter Helm, for example, has argued that the European 
Union’s climate policies have conferred large economic rents on 
special interests and have locked in investment in costly offshore wind 
at the expense of other, more promising renewables.109 
Even when government is acting in good faith and in pursuit of the 
public interest, solutions are not always obvious. Simply investing in 
technologies that reduce emissions relative to the status quo may 
prove counterproductive. Zachary Liscow and Quentin Karpilow, for 
instance, have argued that fuel efficiency standards for automobiles, 
which many environmentalists support, “may perversely undermine 
climate efforts to the extent that they direct innovation away from 
zero-emission cars and toward improving the fuel efficiency of fossil-
fuel vehicles.”110 Similarly, Philippe Aghion and his colleagues have 
suggested that policies designed to encourage the transition from coal 
to cleaner natural gas may reduce emissions in the short run, but they 
 
DIRECT APPROACH TO ENERGY INNOVATION CAN DELIVER CLEAN, CHEAP ENERGY, 
ECONOMIC PRODUCTIVITY AND NATIONAL PROSPERITY 5-7 (2010); Jonathan H. Adler, 
Eyes on a Climate Prize: Rewarding Energy Innovation to Achieve Climate Stabilization, 
35 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 42-45 (2011); Robert W. Hahn, Climate Policy: Separating 
Fact from Fantasy, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 557, 582-87 (2009) [hereinafter Climate 
Policy]; Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 2, at 943-48.  
 108 GRAETZ, supra note 6, at 187-95; NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, PROSPECTIVE 
EVALUATION OF APPLIED ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AT DOE (PHASE TWO) 8 
(2007); Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. Noll, An Assessment of R&D Commercialization 
Programs, in THE TECHNOLOGY PORK BARREL 365, 365-92 (Linda R. Cohen & Roger G. 
Noll eds., 1991); see JOHN A. ALIC ET AL., PEW CTR. ON GLOB. CLIMATE CHANGE, U.S. 
TECHNOLOGY AND INNOVATION POLICIES: LESSONS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 11, 18-19 tbl.1 
(2003) (“[W]here government has sought to define technical attributes or design 
features and ‘pick winners’ in the marketplace, failure has been a common outcome.”); 
NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, ENERGY RESEARCH AT DOE: WAS IT WORTH IT? ENERGY 
EFFICIENCY AND FOSSIL ENERGY RESEARCH 1978 TO 2000, at 6-8 (2001); NAT’L RESEARCH 
COUNCIL, TAX POLICY, supra note 30, at 98-99 (concluding that tax subsidies for 
ethanol have produced little if any environmental benefit); Richard G. Newell, The 
Energy Innovation System: A Historical Perspective, in ACCELERATING ENERGY 
INNOVATION: INSIGHTS FROM MULTIPLE SECTORS 25, 27-28 (Rebecca M. Henderson & 
Richard G. Newell eds., 2011). 
 109 DIETER HELM, THE CARBON CRUNCH: HOW WE’RE GETTING CLIMATE CHANGE 
WRONG AND HOW TO FIX IT 94-99 (2012). 
 110 Liscow & Karpilow, supra note 5, at 441. 
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may backfire in the long run by locking in long-lived natural gas 
infrastructure, which could impede the development of renewables.111 
If Congress were to devote a large sum of money to clean 
technology innovation, the billion-dollar question would be who 
should determine how that money will be spent and according to what 
procedure. In this Part, we advocate for prediction markets as a key 
component of this process. 
The risk of incompetence and the dangers of special interest 
influence lead many scholars to downplay the potential role for 
Congress in allocating funds and to instead call for substantial 
authority to be placed in the hands of administrative agencies advised 
by experts.112 Congress could, for example, appropriate funds with a 
broad delegation of authority to one or more agencies instructing 
them to award grants to promote clean technology. In Section A, we 
explain how a grant-making institution could incorporate prediction 
markets to improve the grant selection process. In Section B, we 
discuss the more radical possibility of incorporating prediction 
markets at the congressional level. Section C addresses caveats and 
criticisms. 
Based on the theory and evidence outlined in Part I, prediction 
markets are particularly useful when one or more of the following 
conditions are met: (i) relevant information is widely dispersed and 
those possessing it have little incentive (or perhaps even a 
disincentive) to voluntarily reveal it to policymakers; (ii) powerful 
groups have an incentive to spread misinformation; (iii) no single 
forecasting model dominates; (iv) true experts are hard to identify or 
may be subject to cognitive and emotional biases; (v) experts stand to 
benefit financially or reputationally from their forecasts; and (vi) 
policymakers will have difficulty correctly determining how much 
weight to give to particular pieces of information. 
 
 111 AGHION ET AL., supra note 106, at 9-10. Natural gas-fired power plants are, 
however, a good match for the growing share of renewables in the U.S. and global 
electricity mix as their fast ramping capacity offers critical balancing services for 
intermittent power production from solar and wind generators.  
 112 See, e.g., Adler, supra note 107, at 42-45 (advocating “technological inducement 
prizes for climate-related innovations” with Congress to “identify, in broad terms, the 
purposes for which prizes should be used,” while delegating the task of developing 
specific prize proposals to expert panels overseen by agency administrators); Hahn, 
Climate Policy, supra note 107, at 587-88 (acknowledging the “clear danger” that 
climate R&D will become politicized and advocating for “giving respected agencies 
such as the National Science Foundation considerable funding authority, and 
encouraging or providing peer review”).  
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All of these circumstances are present when it comes to predicting 
the consequences of green subsidies, which makes it difficult for 
policymakers to obtain reliable forecasts. Key technological 
breakthroughs could stem from a variety of sources that are not 
currently obvious even to elite scientists and engineers.113 In other 
words, information is widely dispersed. Moreover, people with 
information may be reluctant to reveal it. For example, employees at a 
company developing novel carbon sequestration technology may 
conclude that the technology will never become commercially viable, 
but choose not to publicly reveal this belief for fear that their employer 
will retaliate against them. Special interest groups have an incentive to 
lobby for subsidies and even to procure and disseminate research that 
may be biased in their favor.114 Experts may be biased due to 
ideological commitments and reputational concerns. Some climate 
scientists might be reluctant to discuss geoengineering for fear that 
policymakers and the public may conclude that an easy and painless 
solution to global warming will eventually present itself, offering a 
rationale for inaction in the meantime.115 Others may be ideologically 
opposed to solutions that emphasize nuclear energy.116 Even honest 
and unbiased experts may disagree about whether the government 
should, for example, focus its efforts on solar technology instead of 
wind, in which case policymakers may have no way to determine 
whom to believe. Prediction markets can help cut through the 
complexity and misinformation by giving a diverse group of people an 
incentive to truthfully and anonymously reveal what they know while 
producing a confidence-weighted price that summarizes relevant 
information. 
A. Use of Prediction Markets by ARPA-E and Other Administrative 
Agencies 
In this section, we use the Department of Energy’s ARPA-E program 
as a case study to explain how an administrative agency might use 
prediction markets to improve the grant selection process.117 ARPA-E 
 
 113 See MCKINSEY & CO., “AND THE WINNER IS . . .”: CAPTURING THE PROMISE OF 
PHILANTHROPIC PRIZES 23 (2009).  
 114 See, e.g., Mullins & Nicas, supra note 55 (reporting on efforts by Google to fund 
academic research that allowed it to defend itself from antitrust regulation).  
 115 See Mark G. Lawrence, The Geoengineering Dilemma: To Speak or Not to Speak, 
77 CLIMATIC CHANGE 245, 247 (2006).  
 116 See HELM, supra note 109, at 97; Hahn, Climate Policy, supra note 107, at 586.  
 117 We acknowledge that the government’s prior experience with prediction 
markets has not been encouraging. In the early 2000s, the Defense Department 
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began operating in 2009 with a mission to promote transformative 
innovation in energy technology by funding high-risk, high-reward 
research that would not otherwise be funded by the private sector.118 
This mission includes the development of technologies to reduce 
carbon emissions.119 Since its inception, ARPA-E has funded over $1.5 
billion in research on more than 500 projects.120 In 2010, for example, 
ARPA-E awarded $6 million to fund research related to energy kites — 
airborne wind turbines intended to generate and deliver wind power 
from an airborne platform.121 
For our purposes, ARPA-E makes a nice case study because effective 
climate change mitigation requires new and transformative energy 
technologies. The prediction markets discussed in this section could, 
however, easily be adapted to fit the missions and procedures of other 
grant-making institutions and agencies. 
1. The Grant Selection Process 
To understand how ARPA-E might incorporate prediction markets, 
it is helpful to deconstruct the agency’s existing process for granting 
awards. While the director of ARPA-E decides which projects 
ultimately receive funding, he makes this determination in close 
consultation with the agency’s program directors.122 In general, 
program directors are top researchers who typically serve three-year 
terms.123 These elite scientists come from positions in industry, 
government, or academia, and usually return to one of these sectors 
following their stint with ARPA-E.124 
 
sponsored a project to develop prediction markets to predict military and political 
stability around the world. The project was canceled for political reasons after certain 
politicians and the media (falsely) alleged that the government planned to encourage 
betting on terrorist attacks. Robin D. Hanson, Designing Real Terrorism Futures, 128 
PUB. CHOICE 257, 258-63 (2006). We believe, however, that the prediction markets 
that we propose would be much less controversial because the subject matter is not as 
inflammatory.  
 118 42 U.S.C. § 16538(c)(1)-(2) (2018). 
 119 Id. § 16538(c)(1)(A)(ii).  
 120 Joseph S. Manser et al., ARPA-E: Accelerating U.S. Energy Innovation, 1 AM. 
CHEMICAL SOC’Y ENERGY LETTERS 987, 987 (2016).  
 121 ARPA-E, ARPA-E: THE FIRST SEVEN YEARS: A SAMPLING OF PROJECT OUTCOMES 83-
84 (2016).  
 122 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., AN ASSESSMENT OF ARPA-E 38-39 
(2017).  
 123 See William B. Bonvillian & Richard Van Atta, ARPA-E and DARPA: Applying the 
DARPA Model to Energy Innovation, 36 J. TECH. TRANSFER 469, 485-86 (2011).  
 124 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 56. 
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The ARPA-E funding process typically begins when a program 
director pitches an idea for a new program that targets an area of 
energy technology.125 Once a program is accepted, agency staff gather 
information and solicit input from experts in the field to more 
precisely determine the research focus.126 The process includes a 
“constructive confrontation,” a debate about the program among all 
ARPA-E program directors.127 If the agency’s director approves the 
program, ARPA-E issues a funding opportunity announcement 
(“FOA”) soliciting concept papers for research ideas pertaining to the 
program.128 
Once concept papers are received, ARPA-E sends them to external 
reviewers who assign numerical scores.129 “A merit review board, 
usually chaired by the program director who proposed the [program 
in the first place], reviews and discusses the . . . papers.”130 The board 
is not bound by the reviewers’ scores, and instead makes independent 
recommendations to the ARPA-E director, who decides which 
applicants will be asked to submit full applications.131 Full 
applications must include well-defined outcomes and deliverables as 
well as a project schedule that sets significant milestones.132 The full 
applications then undergo another round of external reviews and 
review by a merit review board.133 The ARPA-E director selects certain 
applications to negotiate the terms of an award, including the level of 
funding as well as specific and quantifiable project milestones.134 
Ultimately, the agency selects about five percent of the concept papers 
received for award negotiation.135 
Projects typically receive funding for between six months and four 
years and award amounts average $2.3 million, with some projects 
receiving as much as $9.1 million.136 Throughout the project, ARPA-E 
staff, including the program director, are in frequent contact with the 
 
 125 Id. at 32.  
 126 Id. at 34.  
 127 Id. 
 128 Id. ARPA-E also occasionally issues open-ended FOAs that request concept 
papers on any potentially transformative energy technology. Id. at 35-36.  
 129 Id. at 37.  
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. at 38-39; Manser et al., supra note 120, at 988. 
 133 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 38-39. 
 134 Id. at 40-42. 
 135 Id. at 62. For review of projects that the agency has funded, see generally ARPA-
E, supra note 121. 
 136 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 68. 
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research team.137 The program director periodically evaluates the 
project to determine if it is meeting milestones. If not, milestones may 
be modified, and, in some cases, funding for a project has been 
canceled because the program director concluded that the research 
team could not meet its objectives.138 
2. Concerns with ARPA-E’s Procedures 
At Congress’s request, the National Academy of the Sciences 
recently assessed the operations of ARPA-E. While the National 
Academy’s report was largely positive, it also cautioned that it can take 
many years (perhaps even decades) to determine whether early-stage 
research of the type funded by ARPA-E will turn out to be 
transformative.139 Consequently, empirical evidence to date is 
insufficient to draw reliable conclusions regarding the agency’s success 
in achieving its mission.140 
The National Academy’s report notwithstanding, ARPA-E’s 
procedures leave considerable room for improvement if the agency is 
to serve as a model for allocating the large and high-stakes research 
and development subsidies necessary to combat climate change. The 
program’s funding decisions are controlled by a relatively small group 
of government officials who rely heavily on group deliberation and 
peer review. As we have discussed, these decision mechanisms, while 
potentially helpful, also suffer from serious flaws.141 To their credit, 
officials at ARPA-E have taken measures to mitigate potential 
problems. ARPA-E is not bound by the scores that peer reviewers 
assign to applications, and the evidence suggests that the agency does 
not simply rubber stamp the applications that receive the highest 
scores.142 In addition, ARPA-E encourages program directors to engage 
in constructive criticism when deliberating whether an application 
deserves funding.143 
Nonetheless, we are not confident that these measures are sufficient 
to fully address the substantial problems with peer review and group 
deliberation. Moreover, they may introduce problems of their own. 
For example, the discretion ARPA-E gives to program directors may, 
 
 137 Id. at 43. 
 138 Id. 
 139 Id. at 96. 
 140 Id. at 126. 
 141 See supra Part I. 
 142 See NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 63-67. 
 143 Id. at 52-53. 
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at least partially, correct for the biases of peer review. But the resulting 
empowerment of program directors could prove counterproductive if 
the directors themselves are biased or lack critical information. After 
all, it is the directors who suggest the specific research programs in the 
first place. Bias among program directors is also of concern because 
many of them come from industry and return there after their 
interlude at ARPA-E and because they are recruited from a relatively 
close-knit professional community.144 Besides, ARPA-E’s culture 
requires program directors “to exert religious zeal in advancing 
selected technologies through the implementation stage.”145 Although 
not definitive, the fact that “[s]ignificant variation in project outcomes 
can be seen across ARPA-E programs”146 suggests that some directors 
have been more successful than others. 
Even if ARPA-E’s decision-making process was perfect, many 
people, and particularly conservatives, will be skeptical of giving a 
small group of bureaucrats and scientists discretion over the allocation 
of large sums of taxpayer dollars. Despite the National Academy’s 
overall positive report, the conservative Heritage Foundation has 
argued that ARPA-E has been captured by various special interest 
groups and that it wastes precious tax dollars by funding projects that 
would otherwise be funded privately.147 Although the Government 
Accountability Office investigated this claim and found “that most 
ARPA-E-type projects could not be funded solely by private 
investors,”148 the Trump administration has signaled that it may 
attempt to eliminate ARPA-E’s funding.149 
3. A Prediction Market for Transformative Energy Projects 
Prediction markets could complement the group deliberation and 
peer review processes currently in place at ARPA-E and address some 
 
 144 See id. at 56. 
 145 Bonvillian & Van Atta, supra note 123, at 489. 
 146 NAT’L ACADS. OF SCIS., ENG’G, AND MED., supra note 122, at 103-04. 
 147 See HERITAGE FOUND., BLUEPRINT FOR BALANCE: A FEDERAL BUDGET FOR FISCAL 
YEAR 2018, at 61 (2017). 
 148 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-12-112, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY: 
ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY-ENERGY COULD BENEFIT FROM INFORMATION ON 
APPLICANTS’ PRIOR FUNDING 12-14 (2012). 
 149 See Christa Marshall, Fears Rise About ARPA-E’s Future Under Trump, E&E 
NEWS: GREENWIRE (Feb. 3, 2017), https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060049535; Brad 
Plumer, Scientists Praise Energy Innovation Office Trump Wants to Shut Down, N.Y. 
TIMES (June 13, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/13/climate/arpa-e-national-
academy-sciences.html. 
  
2019] Betting on Climate Policy 1457 
of the concerns outlined above by forecasting the likelihood of success 
of ARPA-E’s projects. They might also assuage the agency’s 
conservative critics who tend to have more faith in markets as sources 
of information than in scientists and bureaucrats. 
Neither energy technologies nor agency procedures are easily 
transformed overnight. Accordingly, we begin with a modest proposal 
for incremental change to ARPA-E’s project selection process intended 
to jumpstart experimentation with prediction markets. Imagine that 
ARPA-E is considering applications received in response to an FOA for 
projects related to efficient gasoline engine design.150 Program officials 
could set up a prediction market for each application to forecast the 
project’s likelihood of success. They would need to define exactly 
what success means for each proposal and establish a date and metric 
by which success or failure would be determined.151 One possibility 
requiring little deviation from current practice would be to define 
success as a determination made by ARPA-E at the end of the funding 
period that the project has met its milestones. Given that milestones 
are negotiated after an application is accepted and that these 
milestones are sometimes revised during the project, traders would 
implicitly have to predict what the milestones will be, but ARPA-E 
decision makers currently do this when they select applications for 
funding. Another possibility would be to have the market predict 
whether a project will be canceled prior to completion for failure to 
achieve its milestones. 
Once success is defined, traders would bet on the outcome, 
receiving $1 per contract if the project succeeds and nothing if it fails. 
Bets would be conditioned on ARPA-E awarding the grant and would 
be canceled otherwise.152 To avoid public disclosure of confidential 
information contained in grant applications, officials could limit 
participation in the market to ARPA-E employees and outside experts 
who participate in the ARPA-E peer review process. To avoid running 
afoul of gambling laws, the market could be based on play money with 
winners receiving prizes and bragging rights. Alternatively, ARPA-E 
could provide participants with an initial stake so that they are not 
 
 150 See, e.g., Efficient Engine Design, ARPA-E, https://arpa-e.energy.gov/?q=slick-
sheet-project/efficient-engine-design (last visited Nov. 14, 2018).  
 151 For prediction markets to function properly, outcomes must be clearly defined 
and rules of adjudication stable. Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 
62, at 120.  
 152 The unwinding approach to conditional prediction markets has proven 
commercially feasible. MICHAEL ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY: MARKET MECHANISMS 
FOR PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DECISION MAKING 142 (2007) [hereinafter PREDICTOCRACY].  
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putting their own money at risk,153 or traders could participate in a 
lottery offering prizes with raffle tickets allocated in proportion to 
prediction accuracy.154 
We admit that the experimental use of prediction markets we 
propose here would have no more than a limited impact. The 
underlying mechanism, however, has the potential to provide valuable 
information to ARPA-E decision-makers. The clearing price for each 
prediction market would aggregate the views of highly trained experts 
to deliver a transparent and convenient forecast. The ability to trade 
anonymously would further encourage truthful predictions and 
mitigate some of the biases that afflict group deliberation and peer 
review. 
More importantly, smaller-scale experimentation with this type of 
low-risk prediction market could pave the way for more ambitious 
efforts going forward. Like any new tool in the administrative toolkit, 
prediction markets must first prove themselves before they can 
become a routine part of the policymaking process. Importantly, 
ARPA-E could immediately implement the mechanism proposed here 
at low cost and without the need for further enabling legislation. Once 
officials recognize the value added by prediction markets, they can 
resort (and defer) to them more often. In the long term, 
experimentation can create an empirical track record that facilitates 
ongoing improvements to prediction market design and 
implementation. 
4. A Prediction Market for ARPA-E Programs 
By limiting participation to a small group of experts and government 
officials, our proposal for project prediction markets fails to unlock 
the full potential of markets to aggregate widely dispersed information 
and to amalgamate diverse viewpoints. The simplest way to address 
this concern would be to open project prediction markets to the 
public. Grant applications may, however, contain confidential 
information and public disclosure could jeopardize an applicant’s 
ability to patent inventions flowing from the grant. This might not 
discourage all applications, but the concern is significant enough to 
raise questions about the usefulness of this type of prediction market. 
 
 153 See Tom W. Bell, Government Prediction Markets: Why, Who, and How, 116 PA. 
ST. L. REV. 403, 418 (2011).  
 154 Cf. SUNSTEIN, INFOTOPIA, supra note 44, at 117 (describing how Microsoft has 
used markets of this type). 
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An alternative approach would be for ARPA-E to set up prediction 
markets to guide the allocation of large blocks of money. These 
prediction markets would be open to the public and based on real 
money. As discussed above, under current practice, ARPA-E 
periodically identifies particular program areas worthy of grant 
funding and then solicits specific project proposals. This process could 
easily incorporate prediction markets to identify particularly 
promising program areas. The agency could, for example, propose to 
issue $50 million in grants related to carbon capture research.155 
Prediction markets would then forecast whether the proposal would 
likely succeed in reaching the agency’s pre-determined research 
objective. 
A few technical points are worth noting. The first relates to the 
question of what outcome these prediction markets should focus on as 
the measure of a proposal’s success. Ideally, the market would predict 
whether the proposal would affect some comprehensive measure of 
social welfare that might include economic productivity as measured 
by GDP and other welfare indices designed to measure environmental 
quality, health, and happiness.156 It will be difficult, however, to obtain 
agreement on how to measure social welfare. Furthermore, even if 
everyone agreed on the appropriate metric, in practice, the measure 
would no doubt prove noisy so that only proposals expected to 
generate very significant consequences would produce any measurable 
effect.157 As a result, prediction markets might be of little use in 
assessing less consequential proposals even if those proposals might 
produce substantial net benefits in the long run or serve as stepping 
stones for more transformative research.158 
Program-level prediction markets could address this challenge 
through more narrowly defined outcome measures.159 For proposals 
 
 155 Funding for focused technology programs typically ranges from thirty to fifty 
million dollars and is allocated among five to fifteen projects. Manser et al., supra note 
120, at 987.  
 156 Cf. Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra note 99, at 152 (arguing for the adoption of 
policies that, according to prediction markets, would improve national welfare).  
 157 One way to deal with noisy predictions would be to use a prediction market to 
predict the difference between prices in two other prediction markets, one of which is 
conditioned on adoption of a policy and the other on failure to adopt. See 
ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 203.  
 158 Nonetheless, even measures that are noisy can be useful for evaluation of 
proposals. See Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra note 99, at 173-74.  
 159 Cf. id. at 171 (demonstrating the utility of “more focused welfare measures” by 
noting how a stadium policy could have different impacts on national and regional 
welfare).  
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that focus on technologies designed to curb climate change, an 
obvious option would be to forecast their effects on carbon emissions. 
Even more narrowly, the markets could forecast intermediate metrics 
of success such as citations to funded research in academic journals or 
patent applications and the amount of follow-on funding that projects 
will receive. 
Notice, however, that as the focus moves from broader to narrower 
measures of success, the relationship between the predicted outcome 
(e.g., carbon emissions or journal citations) and the ultimate outcome 
of interest (i.e., social welfare or environmental quality) becomes more 
tenuous and less politically palatable. Some conservatives, for 
instance, might object to markets that predict reductions in carbon 
emissions because they question the link between emissions and 
global warming. 
The second technical point relates to the type of prediction market 
used.160 A particularly promising approach would be for ARPA-E to 
use prediction markets to obtain a probability distribution for various 
values of the outcome of interest. For example, ARPA-E could issue 
contracts paying $1 if the U.S. transportation sector’s carbon emissions 
are between 2 and 2.1 billion metric tons in 2030, conditioned on the 
government making a $100 million grant for research to develop a 
more efficient gasoline engine. It could issue similar contracts for 
emissions levels between 1.7 and 1.8 billion metric tons, 1.8 and 1.9 
billion metric tons, and so forth. A similar set of markets could be 
conditioned on the absence of the grant. Comparing the resulting 
probability distributions for each set of markets would provide 
information not only about the proposal’s expected effect on 
emissions, but also about the uncertainty of those expectations.161 
Alternatively, as we suggested in the Introduction, the government 
could use prediction markets to predict the level of carbon emissions. 
Under this approach, a contract could pay $1 for each 100 million 
metric tons of emissions in the transportation sector in the year 2030. 
If such a contract were selling for $20, its price would imply a forecast 
of 2 billion metric tons. Again, ARPA-E could issue contracts 
conditioned on a grant for gasoline engine research and on the 
absence of the grant, and the difference in price would forecast the 
effect of the grant. 
 
 160 In prediction market parlance, we are proposing a family of winner-take-all 
contracts. For evidence that the approach we recommend can work, see Wolfers & 
Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 114-15. For a discussion of other types 
of prediction markets, see generally id. at 109-10.  
 161 See id. at 109-10. 
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Finally, ARPA-E could obtain additional information by varying the 
contingency on which a market is conditioned. It could, for example, 
establish prediction markets to forecast the effects of allotting money 
for carbon capture research conditioned on various levels of 
investment, e.g., $50 million, $100 million, or $150 million. These 
markets would provide guidance on the optimal amount of funding 
and its allocation. 
B. Use of Prediction Markets by Congress 
Thus far, we have proposed the use of prediction markets by a 
grant-making institution either to forecast the outcome of projects or 
to determine the research areas to which funds should be allocated. A 
potential criticism of our proposals is that they assume that grants are 
the best way to encourage clean technology innovation. Perhaps tax 
dollars would be better spent on technology inducement prizes or 
funding a clean technology research and development tax credit. It is a 
testament to the versatility of prediction markets that they can also 
help inform the choice among these competing policy options. To 
illustrate, Congress could set aside $10 billion to fund clean 
technology research. It could draft specific proposals to distribute the 
money via prizes or grants made by grant-making institutions or to 
use it to fund a clean technology R&D tax credit.162 Prediction 
markets could then forecast the effects of these proposals on carbon 
emissions or another outcome of interest. In fact, multiple market 
predictions could be combined to determine the optimal mix of 
policies. 
C. Caveats and Criticisms 
Any proposal as daring and far-reaching in its consequences as the 
use of prediction markets to guide climate policy will inevitably elicit 
criticism. This section addresses potential criticisms and adds some 
important caveats. 
 
 162 For a discussion of the various ways in which the government could subsidize 
clean energy, see generally David Popp, Innovation and Climate Policy, 2 ANN. REV. 
RESOURCE ECON. 275 (2010). Michael Abramowicz has suggested to us the intriguing 
possibility that the government could use ex post subsidies as an alternative to 
prediction markets in some instances. The government would announce that it plans 
to pay out in the future some amount of subsidy for clean technology and then private 
capital markets would direct investment toward technologies that investors believe the 
government would likely reward.  
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1. Market Manipulation and Trader Biases 
Perhaps the most obvious concern with using prediction markets to 
guide public policy is that parties with a financial interest in a policy 
might bet heavily on their favored outcome to manipulate the result. 
Some of the markets that we have proposed would not be open to the 
public. Participation would be limited to a few experts and 
government officials and the dollar amounts involved would be small 
so that manipulation should not be a major problem. But limiting 
participation comes at the cost of losing potentially valuable input 
from those unable to participate. On the other hand, manipulation is a 
critical concern for any market open to the public. Coal companies, 
for example, might bet in a way that steers subsidies toward carbon 
capture research, not because they consider carbon capture to be a 
sound investment, but because they stand to gain if the subsidies pay 
off, and they will not bear the full cost of failure. 
The only way to determine whether the risk of manipulation is a 
fatal flaw is through experimentation. The limited evidence to date 
suggests that sustained manipulation of prediction market prices is 
difficult, albeit perhaps not impossible.163 There are, however, reasons 
for optimism. By trading based on something other than the estimated 
value of the underlying contract, would-be manipulators function as 
noise traders. Noise traders effectively subsidize speculative markets 
by providing profit opportunities to traders who are better informed 
about fundamental values. In particular, arbitrageurs can profit from 
manipulators by taking their bets, thereby foiling their attempts at 
manipulation. Paradoxically, manipulators can even make prediction 
markets more accurate by giving better informed traders an extra 
incentive to participate.164 
In addition, the risk posed by manipulation depends on the 
circumstances.165 In markets where trader forecasts are based on 
 
 163 For recent reviews of the literature, see generally Joyce E. Berg & Thomas A. 
Rietz, Market Design, Manipulation, and Accuracy in Political Prediction Markets: 
Lessons from the Iowa Electronic Markets, 47 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 293 (2014); Cary 
Deck et al., Affecting Policy by Manipulating Prediction Markets: Experimental Evidence, 
85 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 48, 49-50 (2013); Simon Kloker & Tobias T. Kranz, 
Manipulation in Prediction Markets: Chasing the Fraudsters (June 10, 2017) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://aisel.aisnet.org/ecis2017_rip/47/. 
 164 See Robin Hanson & Ryan Oprea, A Manipulator Can Aid Prediction Market 
Accuracy, 76 ECONOMICA 304, 305 (2009).  
 165 For conditional prediction markets, the expected cost of manipulation decreases 
with the likelihood that the condition will be met. See Lionel Page, The Ability of 
Markets to Predict Conditional Probabilities: Evidence from the U.S. Presidential 
Campaign, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS supra note 63, at 123, 
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publicly available information and traders do not have private 
information bearing on the outcome of interest, manipulation should 
be less of a problem because an arbitrageur has no reason to believe 
that recent trades are based on information that she herself does not 
possess. As a result, she will be more likely to make trades that correct 
the market price. Moreover, even where some traders have private 
information, other traders may be able to counteract manipulation 
attempts if they know that incentives for manipulation exist.166 
A related concern is that traders might suffer from biases that could 
affect the market price.167 But here again there is cause for optimism. 
Studies of election prediction markets have found that those markets 
make remarkably accurate predictions even though traders are not 
representative of voters generally and many traders suffer from 
numerous biases, including excessively optimistic expectations of their 
preferred candidates.168 These markets function well because, at the 
margin, the market price is determined by a small but well-informed 
and less biased group of active traders who profit by taking advantage 
of the partisans.169 Unlike group deliberation or polls in which 
numbers matter most, a small number of informed and confident 
traders can drive outcomes in prediction markets. 
2. Thin Markets 
A market with little trading activity might not produce a reliable 
price signal.170 Thin, illiquid markets could be a problem particularly 
when the government creates multiple, related prediction markets on 
the same topic. 
 
135. In the policy context, manipulation might be a problem for advisory markets 
where traders believe that the policy is unlikely to be adopted.  
 166 See Robin Hanson et al., Information Aggregation and Manipulation in an 
Experimental Market, 60 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 449, 458 (2006).  
 167 See, e.g., William N. Goetzmann & Massimo Massa, Daily Momentum and 
Contrarian Behavior of Index Fund Investors, 37 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 375, 
379-81 (2002) (finding evidence of biased behavior among investors in a stock index 
fund).  
 168 Berg et al., Results, supra note 79, at 742-49.  
 169 See id. at 749.  
 170 See Ledyard, supra note 62, at 61. Note, however, that empirical evidence 
suggests that even thin markets can sometimes perform well. See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 
Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 113-14. Moreover, prediction market technicians 
have developed mechanisms for producing accurate predictions even in thin markets. 
See, e.g., Robin Hanson, Combinatorial Information Market Design, 5 INFO. SYS. 
FRONTIERS 107, 117-18 (2003).  
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When markets are limited to a small group of bureaucrats and 
experts, the government can improve market trading and liquidity by 
offering participants an incentive to trade, e.g., by giving them money 
with which to make bets or by offering prizes. Public prediction 
markets, on the other hand, should generate sufficient trading 
spontaneously so long as traders believe that the markets might 
actually influence policy. If the market related to a policy proposal is 
thin, interested parties could manipulate it by betting on their 
preferred outcome. In doing so, they would then become noise 
traders, and speculators could make money by betting against them in 
a self-reinforcing process that thickens the market.171 Even if noise 
traders fail to materialize, the government can simply subsidize the 
market directly, e.g., by making random trades and thereby 
functioning as a noise trader or by subsidizing an automated market 
maker.172 Another way to encourage market activity is to increase the 
importance of prediction markets by putting them directly in charge of 
decisions,173 a possibility that we discuss in more detail below. 
3. The Risks (and Benefits) of Insider Trading 
Unlike stock markets, prediction markets aim to provide 
information. Therefore, insider trading can be a feature rather than a 
bug.174 If prediction markets are open to the public and based on real 
money, then people who have inside information or a direct financial 
interest in the outcome should generally be allowed to trade along 
with government officials, as long as their ability to do so is well 
publicized.175 The main concern here is that insider trading will 
discourage others from participating because they assume that insiders 
know more and will take advantage of them.176 But that risk will be 
minimal in the public prediction markets that we contemplate because 
relevant information is likely to be widely dispersed. Insiders may 
have some additional information, but the information asymmetry 
 
 171 Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra note 99, at 168.  
 172 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 121; Robin Hanson, 
Prediction Markets “Fail” To Mooch, OVERCOMING BIAS (July 19, 2012, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.overcomingbias.com/2012/07/prediction-markets-fail-to-mooch.html.  
 173 See ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 211-13.  
 174 Cf. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966) (arguing 
that permitting insider trading with respect to stocks would promote efficiency by 
ensuring that stock prices incorporate private information).  
 175 Cf. Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 54-55 (“[W]e would suggest that there 
should be a presumption against ever limiting participation in markets.”).  
 176 Id. at 55.  
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should not be severe. To the extent information asymmetry is 
significant for a given market, Robin Hanson has proposed a 
mechanism for dealing with it. Insiders would be allowed to trade, but 
their trades would be disclosed in advance.177 As a last resort, if there 
is a risk that arbitrageurs cannot overcome the risk of manipulation by 
insiders, then a ban on insider trading might be appropriate, though it 
may impair market accuracy. 
4. Correlation Is Not the Same as Causation 
If conditional prediction markets are advisory rather than binding, 
then policymakers must be careful not to confuse correlation with 
causation.178 To illustrate the potential problem, consider a scenario 
where prediction market prices suggest that future carbon emissions 
will be substantially lower if the government heavily subsidizes carbon 
capture technology. Unfortunately, policymakers cannot simply 
conclude that traders believe that increasing the carbon capture 
subsidy will cause the reduction in emissions. 
If the government has private, policy-relevant information, then 
traders will try to account for this information asymmetry in their 
forecasts.179 Specifically, traders may conclude that policymakers will 
increase the carbon capture subsidy only if policymakers have 
information that supports doing so. In that case, the market’s 
prediction of future emissions conditioned on the subsidy may be 
biased downward to reflect the fact that the subsidy will occur only 
under favorable circumstances. Note, however, that this problem only 
arises if traders believe that policymakers have important private 
information, which will not always be the case. In any event, the 
government can mitigate this problem by allowing insiders with the 
same private information to participate in the market.180 Another 
approach would be to place the decision in the hands of someone 
without private information, in which case that person would rely 
solely on the prediction market along with publicly disclosed expert 
reports.181 Those with private information could still influence the 
 
 177 Robin Hanson, Decision Markets for Policy Advice, in PROMOTING THE GENERAL 
WELFARE: NEW PERSPECTIVES ON GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE 151, 172 n.20 (Alan S. 
Gerber & Eric M. Patashnik, eds., 2006).  
 178 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 123-24.  
 179 See Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra note 99, at 162; Page, supra note 165, at 133-34.  
 180 See Hahn & Tetlock, supra note 102, at 254-55; Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, supra 
note 99, at 162.  
 181 ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 207. 
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decision by trading in the market or publicizing what they know for 
the benefit of the decision-maker. In addition, traders should be 
informed that the decision to adopt or reject the policy will be made 
during a short decision window preferably in the near future.182 This 
will allay fears that new information might come to light before the 
market closes. 
Even if the government has no private information bearing on a 
policy’s likelihood of success, the adoption of the policy in question 
may still correlate with a change in the outcome of interest without 
being the sole cause of that change. For instance, traders may 
conclude that the government will increase the carbon capture subsidy 
only if the president decides to prioritize climate policy, a decision 
that would entail adoption of numerous complementary policies. In 
that case, the market may predict that emissions will fall if the carbon 
capture subsidy increases, but only because traders expect the overall 
package of climate policies to be effective, not necessarily because they 
believe that carbon capture itself will succeed. 
In the abstract, this latter problem presents a significant challenge to 
the use of advisory prediction markets. But if, as should often be the 
case, policymakers have no reason to suspect problems of reverse 
causation or omitted variable bias,183 they can more confidently rely 
on prediction market forecasts. Moreover, prediction market 
technicians have developed sophisticated methods for disentangling 
correlation and causation.184 Due to space constraints, we will not 
discuss these methods in detail. Suffice it to say that the problem of 
using prediction markets to draw conclusions about causation strikes 
us as no more daunting than the many challenges facing conventional 
decision-making mechanisms. 
 
 182 See id. 
 183 Omitted variable bias may occur when a variable is omitted from a statistical 
analysis and that variable is correlated with the independent variable and an included 
dependent variable. SCOTT W. MENARD, LOGISTIC REGRESSION: FROM INTRODUCTORY TO 
ADVANCED CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS 107 (2010). 
 184 See, e.g., Henderson et al., supra note 65, at 47-50 (recommending the use of 
instrumental variables); Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 
122-24 (discussing the use of contingent contracts); Robin Hanson, Shock Response 
Futures, OVERCOMING BIAS (May 31, 2007, 6:00 AM), http://www.overcomingbias. 
com/2007/05/shock_response_.html (proposing shock response futures); see generally 
Eric Snowberg et al., How Prediction Markets Can Save Event Studies, in PREDICTION 
MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 63, at 18, 27-30 (discussing how 
incorporating prediction markets into event studies can facilitate causal inferences). 
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The simplest way to cope with the correlation-versus-causation 
problem would be to put decision markets directly in charge.185 For 
example, the government could announce in advance that if prediction 
markets predict that $100 million in grants for carbon capture 
research will reduce emissions by x amount in 2030, then it will fund 
the grants.186 
We recognize that self-deciding prediction markets of this type 
constitute a significant departure from current practice. We do not 
recommend them for important decisions absent further 
experimentation and a strong empirical record of success. Having said 
that, increased reliance on prediction markets might not be as risky as 
it seems. Currently, group deliberation, peer review, and cost-benefit 
analysis, despite their well-documented flaws, play a substantial role 
in policymaking, particularly within administrative agencies. 
Moreover, even if self-deciding prediction markets would occasionally 
make grave mistakes, these markets might, on balance, still improve 
on current institutions, which many argue frequently produce very 
costly errors. 
Importantly, self-deciding prediction markets would not rule out the 
use of expert reports and committees or even cost-benefit analysis. In 
fact, experts could provide valuable information to traders. The real 
innovation of a self-deciding prediction market is that the market itself 
would serve as the decision maker rather than an individual or 
committee. The novelty of this approach provides good reason for 
caution. But neither theory nor empirical evidence supports an a priori 
claim that individuals or deliberating groups will always or usually 
make better policy decisions than prediction markets. 
5. Longshot Bias 
Numerous studies have found that sports gamblers bet excessively 
on longshots.187 This could be because they enjoy taking risks or 
because they overestimate the likelihood of low-probability events.188 
 
 185 See ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 211; Hanson, Bet on Beliefs, 
supra note 99, at 162. 
 186 Because of the risk of brief price spikes, the government would likely not want 
to focus on the price at any given time, but instead average transaction prices over a 
longer period. See Abramowicz, Information Markets, supra note 102, at 946. 
 187 E.g., Oikonomidis & Johnson, supra note 63, at 207-08 (reviewing the evidence 
related to soccer betting). 
 188 Erik Snowberg & Justin Wolfers, Explaining the Favorite–Longshot Bias: Is It 
Risk-Love or Misperceptions?, 118 J. POL. ECON. 723, 743-44 (2010) (finding evidence 
of the latter). 
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Evidence suggests that this longshot bias also has some effect on 
prediction markets in that extremely unlikely outcomes are 
overpriced, especially in thin markets.189 If transaction costs are low, 
however, arbitrageurs should be able to minimize the damage by 
taking advantage of biased participants.190 Moreover, longshot bias 
would not be a problem in prediction markets for climate policy 
unless the government adopted policies that markets suggested had an 
extremely low probability of success. 
6. Asset Bubbles 
Some economists believe that speculative markets are prone to 
bubbles during which assets are overvalued for a sustained period.191 
This hypothesis is controversial and difficult to prove. But even if 
bubbles do occur, we have reason to believe that they will not affect 
prediction markets to the same degree as other speculative markets. 
First, in some speculative markets, bubbles may occur because 
investors who recognize that a bubble exists do not know exactly 
when it will burst and are unable or unwilling to put significant capital 
at risk until the market corrects itself.192 In prediction markets, 
however, the amounts involved are often small enough that capital 
constraints should not influence traders’ bets.193 Moreover, when a 
prediction market is open for only a short period, that reduces the risk 
of a prolonged bubble and facilitates arbitrage.194 
Second, stock market bubbles may occur because many investors 
follow trends so that if the market has been increasing, many assume 
it will continue to increase and buy accordingly, creating a self-
fulfilling prophecy that ultimately proves unsustainable.195 Most 
prediction markets, however, should not suffer from this problem 
 
 189 See Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 117-18. 
 190 The government should set up prediction markets to facilitate arbitrage 
opportunities. See Richard Borghesi, Price Biases and Contract Design: Lessons from 
Tradesports, in PREDICTION MARKETS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, supra note 63, at 96, 
105-08 (providing evidence from football prediction markets that properly designed 
contracts facilitate arbitrage and increase efficiency).  
 191 See, e.g., Robert J. Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 
17 J. ECON. PERSP. 83, 96-101 (2003).  
 192 See J. Bradford De Long et al., Noise Trader Risk in Financial Markets, 98 J. POL. 
ECON. 703, 704-06 (1990); Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, The Limits of 
Arbitrage, 52 J. FIN. 35, 36-37 (1997).  
 193 Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 118.  
 194 ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 222-23.  
 195 See Goetzmann & Massa, supra note 167, at 378-88 (discussing the influence of 
momentum traders on the stock market).  
  
2019] Betting on Climate Policy 1469 
because they cannot move in the same direction indefinitely.196 For 
example, the probability that an ARPA-E project will succeed can 
never exceed 100%. 
Finally, in some speculative markets, bubbles may occur because of 
constraints on short selling.197 But in prediction markets, there are no 
constraints on short selling, and there are even mechanisms that 
substitute for short selling.198 
Despite these reasons for optimism, the only way to determine 
whether the prediction markets that we propose are prone to bubbles 
is through experimentation. Even if bubbles do occur on occasion, the 
question is whether other forecasting mechanisms consistently 
perform better. Empirical evidence to date is encouraging: while 
prediction markets are subject to bubbles, the problem has not proven 
to be widespread or significant.199 
7. Time Discounting 
Some of the prediction markets that we envision would have long 
time horizons because the outcomes of interest would not occur until 
years (maybe even decades) into the future. Long time horizons can be 
problematic because during the time they hold contracts, traders forgo 
the return that they would otherwise earn on any invested funds. As a 
result, people become less willing to participate in the market, and the 
market price is distorted, reducing the market’s ability to yield useful 
information.200 Fortunately, market operators can overcome this 
problem by allowing traders to put their money in a self-directed 
investment fund so that they can assemble the portfolio of their 
choice, making them indifferent between investing in prediction 
markets or more traditional markets.201 Moreover, prediction markets 
 
 196 See ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 218-19.  
 197 See Shiller, supra note 191, at 98-100.  
 198 See ABRAMOWICZ, PREDICTOCRACY, supra note 152, at 223; Wolfers & Zitzewitz, 
Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 118. For empirical evidence that short selling 
increases prediction market accuracy, see generally Florian Teschner et al., Short-
Selling in Prediction Markets, 5 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no.2, 2011, at 14.  
 199 See, e.g., Wolfers & Zitzewitz, Prediction Markets, supra note 62, at 118-19.  
 200 See Werner Antweiler, Long-Term Prediction Markets, 6 J. PREDICTION MKTS., no. 
3, 2012, at 43, 60; Lionel Page & Robert T. Clemen, Do Prediction Markets Produce 
Well-Calibrated Probability Forecasts?, 123 ECON. J. 491, 510-11 (2012).  
 201 Antweiler, supra note 200, at 58-59. For commercial prediction markets, 
investors might be concerned about the risk of bankruptcy or of adverse regulatory 
actions. See id. at 60. But for our proposal, these concerns are less significant because 
the markets in question would be government sanctioned.  
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for climate policy do not have to be perfectly efficient to yield useful 
information, particularly if the contract price suggests that a policy 
will have significant effects.202 Under those circumstances, 
policymakers would benefit from the market’s forecast even if the 
contract price was somewhat distorted. 
8. Legal Concerns 
We have recommended some prediction markets that would involve 
real money and be open to the public. A major impediment to these 
markets is that they may run afoul of state gambling laws or could be 
subject to stifling federal regulation as commodities futures markets.203 
We agree with others who have argued that government-sponsored 
prediction markets should not be subject to these restrictive laws,204 
but we also acknowledge that some of the prediction markets that we 
propose probably cannot legally operate without changes to existing 
regulations and perhaps even legislation. Having said that, legal 
concerns pose less of an obstacle to prediction markets such as those 
we suggest for ARPA-E, in which participation would be limited to 
government employees and consultants using play money or where 
the government supplies each participant with an initial stake in 
exchange for an obligation to trade.205 
III. PREDICTION MARKETS TO INFORM STATE CLIMATE POLICIES 
In the absence of comprehensive federal action to address climate 
change and promote clean energy, states are increasingly stepping in 
to fill the policy void.206 Forty-five states and the District of Columbia 
have implemented net-metering policies that enable utility customers 
with solar and other distributed generation assets to effectively run 
their electricity meter backwards and be compensated for any power 
produced in excess of the customer’s power consumption from the 
 
 202 Cf. Vandenbergh et al., supra note 11, at 2006 (making a similar point with 
respect to prediction markets in general).  
 203 For a discussion of the legal concerns surrounding real-money prediction 
markets, see Bell, supra note 153, at 417-25.  
 204 See, e.g., Kenneth J. Arrow et al., The Promise of Prediction Markets, 320 SCI. 
877, 877-78 (2008); Bell, supra note 153, at 424-25. 
 205 See Bell, supra note 153, at 428. 
 206 For an overview of state climate policy action, see Engel & Orbach, supra note 
13; Farber, supra note 13; Stewart, supra note 13; see also Mormann, Clean Energy 
Federalism, supra note 13 (exploring the ideal institutional level of implementation for 
select climate and clean energy policies).  
  
2019] Betting on Climate Policy 1471 
grid.207 Twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. 
territories have adopted renewable portfolio standards208 that create 
markets for low-carbon, renewable energy by requiring electric 
utilities to source a portion of their sales from solar, wind, and other 
low-carbon renewables.209 A few pioneering states, meanwhile, have 
recently begun to experiment with feed-in tariff210 policies that pay 
eligible generators above-market rates designed to cover the higher 
generation costs of emerging climate-friendly energy technologies.211 
Every one of these state climate policies could benefit from 
prediction markets. Subtle differences in design and implementation 
notwithstanding, they all require policymakers and regulators to 
forecast some aspect of the future. As price-based policy tools,212 feed-
in tariffs require policymakers to anticipate the pace of technology 
learning and cost improvements over time to set and maintain 
 
 207 Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electric Grid: 
Distributed Generation and Net Metering, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 46-47 (2017).  
 208 Renewable portfolio standards, also known as a renewable targets or quota 
obligations, set quotas that require electric utility companies to source a certain share 
of the electricity they sell to end-users from renewable sources of energy. See infra Part 
III.B.  
 209 See NC CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR. & DEP’T OF ENERGY, RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO 
STANDARD POLICIES (2016), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/ 
uploads/2014/11/Renewable-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/B73L-ZKTT]. 
Eight more states and one U.S. territory have adopted nonbinding goals for the 
deployment of renewables. See id. For a discussion of the history and political 
background of state renewable portfolio standards, see Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The 
Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & 
POL’Y 10 (2007). For more information on the design and implementation 
characteristics of renewable portfolio standards, see infra Part III.B. 
 210 Feed-in tariffs are two-pronged policies that guarantee renewable power 
generators access to their local power grid and require local electric utilities to purchase 
the power output of these generators at above-market rates. See infra Part III.A. The 
policy’s misleading name — it does not impose any tariff on electricity imports or other 
related activities — is thought to be a tribute to an overly literal translation of its 
implementation in Germany as per the 1991 Stromeinspeisungsgesetz (Electricity Feed-
in Law). See Paul Gipe, Frequently Asked Questions about Feed-in Tariffs, Advanced 
Renewable Tariffs, and Renewable Energy Payments, WIND-WORKS.ORG, http://www.wind-
works.org/cms/index.php?id=211#c930 [https://perma.cc/S3HA-DECB].  
 211 Early adopters of feed-in tariffs at the state level include California, Hawaii, 
Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. See infra notes 215–21 and 
accompanying text. For more information on the design and implementation 
characteristics of feed-in tariffs, see infra Part III.A.  
 212 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES: PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE 
POLICIES 92-93 (2008) [hereinafter DEPLOYING RENEWABLES] (explaining the 
dichotomy of price- and quantity-based policy tools to promote low-carbon renewable 
energy generation technologies).  
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appropriate tariff rates that offer sufficient but not excessive 
remuneration for eligible technologies. Quantity-based policies such as 
renewable portfolio standards let the market determine the level of 
remuneration but require policymakers to forecast the amount of 
solar, wind, and other intermittent renewables that the grid will be 
able to absorb without jeopardizing the reliability of electric service. 
Recent controversies over the equity implications of net metering and 
calls for higher grid usage fees to end alleged cross-subsidization213 ask 
policymakers to assess and weigh the present as well as future costs 
and benefits of low-carbon distributed power generation. Finally, all of 
these, and many other, climate policies require policymakers to 
forecast the potential of specific clean energy technologies to help 
mitigate global warming and climate change. 
A. Feed-in Tariffs: What Rate Is Right? 
Feed-in tariffs have historically been popular among European 
countries including Denmark, Germany, Portugal, and Spain.214 In the 
United States, a growing number of pioneering states have recently 
adopted feed-in tariff programs to promote renewables, including 
California,215 Hawaii,216 Maine,217 Oregon,218 Rhode Island,219 
Vermont,220 and Washington.221 
 
 213 See, e.g., Troy A. Rule, Solar Energy, Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. 
CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115, 129-47 (2014–2015) (discussing the public debate over the 
“fairness” of net metering policies).  
 214 See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES, supra note 212, at 17. For 
further background, see generally David Grinlinton & LeRoy Paddock, The Role of 
Feed-in Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion of Solar Energy Production, 41 U. TOL. L. 
REV. 943, 949-52 (2010). More recently, many jurisdictions outside of Europe have 
adopted feed-in tariffs to promote renewable energy, including the Canadian province 
of Ontario, South Africa, Kenya, the Indian states of West Bengal, Rajasthan, Gujarat, 
and Punjab, as well as Australia’s Capital Territory, New South Wales, and South 
Australia. See MIGUEL MENDONÇA ET AL., POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY: THE FEED-IN 
TARIFF HANDBOOK 90, 97-100, 102-08 (2010). 
 215 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.20 (2018).  
 216 See Stipulation for Protective Order at 1, Public Utilities Commission of Haw. 
(2009) (No. 2008-0273), https://perma.cc/E835-EVXC.  
 217 See ME. STAT. tit. 35-A, § 3603 (2015).  
 218 See OR. REV. STAT. § 757.365 (2016); Order 10-198 Establishing Pilot Program, 
Public Utility Commission of Oregon (2010); Order 10-200 Adopting New Rules, A 
Rulemaking Regarding Solar Photovoltaic Energy Systems (2010); Order 11-339 
Modifying Pilot Program, Public Utility Commission of Oregon (2011).  
 219 See 39 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 39-26.1, 39-26.2 (2016).  
 220 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 30, § 8005a (2018).  
 221 See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 458-20-273 (2018); WASH. REV. CODE § 82.16.110 
  
2019] Betting on Climate Policy 1473 
Structurally, feed-in tariffs are best understood as two-pronged 
policy instruments.222 The “feed-in” prong guarantees renewable 
power generators access to the electric grid to ensure viable sales and 
distribution channels for their power output. The “tariff” prong 
requires local electric utilities to purchase the electricity output of 
these generators at above-market rates that are designed to cover the 
generator’s cost and offer a reasonable return on investment.223 Tariffs 
can be set as a fixed total price for electricity from renewables, a 
premium to be paid in addition to the market price, or a percentage of 
retail rates.224 Like portfolio standards and net metering policies, feed-
in tariff policies allow electric utilities to pass the costs of premium 
payments for low-carbon renewable energy on to their ratepayers.225 
Feed-in tariffs are usually technology-specific, offering different tariff 
rates for different strands of renewable energy technologies based on 
their respective technological maturity and generation costs.226 In 
addition, feed-in tariff design can be size-sensitive to account for the 
different cost structures of utility-scale and distributed generation.227 
While renewable portfolio standards let the market determine 
trading prices for renewable energy credits and, hence, the overall 
 
(2011).  
 222 See Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet U.S. 
Renewable Electricity Targets, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 73, 73 (2007). For a detailed 
description of the various feed-in tariff design elements, see MENDONÇA ET AL., supra 
note 214, at 15-38.  
 223 The first-ever feed-in tariff in the United States, implemented by the 
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five to six percent. See KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TP-6A2-
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9 (2009), https://perma.cc/XSE7-EX5Z. The duration of the utility’s purchase 
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 225 See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 214, at 29.  
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value of renewable electricity, feed-in tariffs require regulators to set 
tariff rates.228 A tariff set too low will fail to attract the necessary 
investment to deploy renewable energy technologies, as the example 
of Argentina illustrates. In response to political opposition, Argentina’s 
2006 feed-in tariff for wind energy was set too low to leverage any 
investment, with deployed wind capacity stagnant at only thirty 
megawatts nationwide — the equivalent of thirteen present-day 
onshore wind turbines.229 In the United States, the city of Palo Alto, 
California experienced similar issues when its solar feed-in tariff rates 
failed to incentivize any deployment during the first three years 
following its adoption in 2012.230 
At the other end of the spectrum, a tariff set too high will impose 
undue hardship on electricity ratepayers and undermines public 
support for renewables, as evidenced by Spain’s feed-in tariff for solar 
photovoltaics. The Spanish regulators chose to adopt rates similar to 
Germany’s (then) widely praised feed-in tariff only to learn that, in 
real terms, these rates were far too high given sunny Spain’s sixty 
percent greater insolation compared to cloudy Germany.231 The 
Spanish policymakers’ mishap delivered sizeable windfall profits to 
solar power investors while imposing considerable costs on the 
country’s ratepayers, eroding the public’s support for renewables and 
eventually forcing the Spanish government to suspend its feed-in tariff 
program.232 
Even when policymakers get the initial feed-in tariff rate right, 
vigilant regulatory oversight and frequent adjustments are needed to 
ensure that tariff rates keep up with cost improvements in renewable 
energy technologies. Growth in deployed capacity enables technology 
learning that, in turn, reduces generation costs and moves low-carbon 
renewable energy technologies closer to grid parity.233 Along the way, 
 
 228 See id. at 19.  
 229 See id. at 57.  
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feed-in tariffs require constant monitoring and modification to keep 
investor returns reasonable and avoid windfalls from tariffs that, for 
example, fail to fall along with tumbling prices for solar panels.234 
State-level feed-in tariffs in the United States, such as that of 
Oregon, give testament to the considerable demands that these 
policies place on policymakers and regulators in their quest to set, and 
maintain, appropriate tariff levels. Oregon’s solar feed-in tariff,235 also 
known as the Oregon Solar Photovoltaic Volumetric Incentive 
Program, launched on July 1, 2010, offering tariff rates of up to $0.65 
per kilowatt-hour of solar-generated electricity.236 The program was 
soon criticized for setting rates that were much too high, offering 
windfall profits to developers.237 During initial enrollment rounds, 
available capacity was, indeed, oversubscribed within a matter of 
minutes, leading the Oregon Public Utility Commission to eventually 
convert capacity allocation from a first-come-first-served system to a 
lottery.238 
To be fair, the regulators in charge of setting Oregon’s feed-in tariff 
rates were given a tall task. Anticipating the real-world cost of solar 
and other low-carbon renewable energy generation projects and, 
hence, the level of remuneration that would cover these costs, while 
also offering a reasonable return — neither excessive nor insufficient 
— on the developer’s investment is a complex undertaking. The magic 
number, often described as the levelized cost of electricity,239 depends 
on a variety of factors, each subject to frequent and sometimes drastic 
 
 234 See Felix Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable 
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 235 See supra note 218.  
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 237 See Pub. Util. Comm’n of Or., Solar Voltaic Comments and Regulations, UM 
1505, at 3 (2011) (statement of Dave Sullivan) (“The incentive rates were at least 
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changes. The cost of solar panels, inverters, and other hardware, for 
example, has experienced a series of dramatic price drops over the past 
decade.240 Soft costs, such as those incurred for permitting, installation 
labor, and capital, are subject to similar fluctuations, yet account for 
an ever-increasing share of overall project cost.241 Finally, Oregon’s 
regulators also had to consider site-specific factors like the variations 
in solar resource quality across different areas of their state.242 
The vast amount of information required to set and maintain 
appropriate feed-in tariff rates illustrates the enormous potential for 
prediction markets to improve policy outcomes. Current practice 
requires public utility commissions, who often lack the necessary 
resources and expertise, to anticipate changes in solar panel prices, 
installation costs, lending rates, and other key inputs. Prediction 
markets offer a platform to aggregate pertinent information from 
industry experts, including manufacturers, installers, financiers and 
developers. Their “best guess” as to the levelized cost of solar 
electricity from, say, a residential rooftop facility in Portland six 
months from today, is likely to be considerably more accurate than 
that of even the most diligent utility commission. As discussed above, 
prediction markets could be structured to yield a probability 
distribution of the expected cost to help policymakers better 
understand the range of cost scenarios and their respective likelihood. 
As relevant information is widely disbursed, feed-in tariff prediction 
markets would function best if open to the public. 
It is worth noting that the regulators in charge of Oregon’s feed-in 
tariff program anticipated that they might err in setting tariff rates at 
the outset of the program. To address the problem, they incorporated 
an automatic rate adjustment mechanism, allowing tariff rates to rise 
or fall from one enrollment round to the next.243 When demand far 
exceeds available capacity, the mechanism reduces the rate for the 
following round and, conversely, raises it if an enrollment round is 
 
 240 See, e.g., RAN FU ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., TP-6A20-68925, U.S. 
SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC SYSTEM COST BENCHMARK: Q1 2017 vi (2017) (reporting cost 
declines of approximately thirty percent for utility-scale solar systems from 2016 to 
2017).  
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COMM’N., supra note 236, 6-7 (2013).  
 243 See id. at 6.  
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undersubscribed, originally in increments of ten percent, and later up 
to twenty percent.244 
Automatic adjustment mechanisms for feed-in tariff rates have been 
adopted in other jurisdictions as well.245 With their reliance on actual 
deployment data, these mechanisms are superior to the previously 
prevailing practice of randomly set annual degression rates.246 
Prediction markets, however, could dramatically improve upon 
automatic adjustment mechanisms. 
From a timing perspective, automatic adjustments inevitably trail 
actual market developments because they react to previously observed 
deployment levels. Add to that the time it takes for the automatic price 
adjustment to become effective and it is easy to understand why 
automatically adjusted feed-in tariff rates are likely to lag behind 
actual cost characteristics, especially in markets as dynamic as those 
for solar and other emerging low-carbon energy technologies. 
Oregon’s feed-in tariff has been criticized for this very reason, as it 
provides for automatic adjustments only every six months.247 In 
contrast, prediction markets could aggregate information from 
knowledgeable parties into a well-informed forecast of what the 
levelized cost of solar electricity from a specific kind of project will be 
when the next enrollment window opens. 
Automatic adjustment mechanisms also tend to lack necessary 
nuance when it comes to the magnitude of adjustments. Oregon’s 
feed-in tariff program, for example, originally assumed that 
adjustments in increments of ten percent would be sufficient to track 
market developments.248 At times of tumbling panel prices, however, 
downward adjustments of ten percent every six months may not be 
sufficient to keep up with steep declines in solar hardware costs. 
Subsequent program amendments allowed for automatic rate 
reductions of up to twenty percent. Such large increments, however, 
pose the inverse risk of excessive rate reductions. Sure enough, 
Oregon’s mechanism eventually overdid its automatic rate reductions, 
as evidenced by the need to raise the feed-in tariff rate in April of 2012 
 
 244 Id. at 7-8.  
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following low deployment after an excessive twenty-percent reduction 
six months prior. Policymakers could avoid problems like those 
encountered by Oregon if they tied tariff rates to prediction market 
forecasts. In dynamic market environments, prediction markets are 
better suited to determine the direction and magnitude of rate 
adjustments than are clumsy automatic rate adjustment mechanisms. 
B. Renewable Portfolio Standards: How Many Renewables Can the Grid 
Absorb? 
Renewable portfolio standards create demand for solar, wind, and 
other low-carbon renewables by requiring electric utility companies to 
source a percentage of the electricity they sell to end-users from 
renewable sources.249 Utilities prove their compliance with these 
requirements through “renewable energy credits.”250 Power plant 
operators normally receive one such credit for every megawatt-hour of 
electricity generated from renewable resources.251 Non-utility power 
generators can sell their renewable energy credits to utilities in order 
to receive a premium on top of their income from power sales in the 
wholesale electricity market. Utilities can also invest in their own 
renewable power generation facilities to earn renewable energy credits 
for the electricity they produce. Whether utilities choose to earn their 
own credits or purchase them from others, they eventually pass the 
associated costs on to their ratepayers.252 
Unlike feed-in tariffs that require regulators to set rates for eligible 
technologies, renewable portfolio standards trust the market’s invisible 
hand to determine trading prices for renewable energy credits and, 
hence, a generator’s overall revenue. While the market price is a 
function of demand and supply, policymakers indirectly affect it 
through the share of the electricity market they require utilities to 
serve with renewables. Requirements vary widely across states, from 
Ohio’s modest 12.5% by 2026 mandate to fifty percent by 2030 in 
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California and New York and all the way to a 100% renewable fueled 
electricity market in Hawaii by 2045.253 These numbers are the 
product of a wide range of inputs, including political forces, resource 
availability and quality, ratepayer advocacy, and utility interests, 
among others. 
From a practical perspective, one of the most important questions 
for policymakers to resolve is how ramping up the share of solar, 
wind, and other weather-dependent renewables will affect the 
reliability of electric service. Critics of the large-scale build-out of solar 
and wind power often claim that the intermittent output profiles of 
these renewable resources will jeopardize the stability of the electrical 
grid. According to one commentator, for example, “[w]hen 
renewables supply 20 to 30 percent of all electricity, many utility-
energy engineers predict, the system will no longer be able to balance 
supply and demand.”254 Empirical evidence from across the globe 
suggests, however, that the grid can likely absorb larger quantities of 
intermittent renewables. Germany, for example, tripled the share of 
solar and wind power in its electricity mix between 2006 and 2013 to 
twenty-six percent, “while managing to reduce average annual outage 
times.”255 
But is there a limit? And, if so, how high is it? The answer to this 
critical question will depend on numerous factors and is likely to vary 
across jurisdictions and, more importantly, electricity networks. With 
information on grid infrastructure, load profiles, and other crucial 
factors widely dispersed, prediction markets are well suited to help 
policymakers gain a better understanding of “their” grid’s ability to 
accommodate a growing share of renewables with intermittent output 
characteristics. Prediction markets could, for example, forecast outage 
times conditioned on the required percentage of renewables in the 
energy mix. 
C. Net Metering: What Are the Costs and Benefits of Distributed 
Generation? 
Adopted by over forty states, net energy metering has become the 
primary mechanism for tracking and rewarding distributed renewable 
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energy generation in the United States.256 Notwithstanding some 
variation across programs, net energy metering generally allows an 
electric utility’s customer to run her meter forward while consuming 
power from the grid and backward while feeding power, e.g., from 
solar panels on her rooftop, into the grid.257 At the end of the billing 
period, the utility charges the customer for the amount of power 
consumed from the grid minus power generated onsite and fed into 
the grid.258 So long as the customer generator, on balance, consumes 
more electricity from the grid than she feeds in, her locally generated 
power is effectively remunerated at the retail electricity rate, several 
times higher than what she could get on the wholesale power 
market.259 
In recent years, net metering programs have come under attack by 
special interest groups.260 Led by electric utilities, opponents argue 
that net metering enables wealthy homeowners with rooftop solar to 
effectively stop paying for vital network maintenance and upgrades 
despite using the grid to supply electricity to their homes when their 
solar panels do not produce enough energy to meet their demand.261 
Already, some states have introduced hefty grid usage fees for 
electricity customers with solar rooftop installations.262 There is no 
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doubt that net energy metering and other clean energy policies have 
important equity implications.263 Even for a cause as worthy as climate 
change mitigation, well-to-do homeowners should not be free riding 
on the electric grid at the expense of lower-income households. Yet, 
the common practice of embedding grid usage fees in volumetric 
charges, when coupled with net metering, allows solar customers to 
significantly reduce, if not altogether eliminate, their contributions to 
grid maintenance and upgrades. 
Some usage fee might, therefore, seem reasonable to prevent 
inequitable cross-subsidization from lower-income to higher-income 
ratepayers. But how high should such a fee be? To answer this 
question, regulators first need to determine how much of a cross-
subsidy, if any, solar customers actually receive from non-solar 
customers. This seemingly simple exercise in basic arithmetic is 
complicated by the fact that solar and non-solar ratepayers alike 
benefit from net metering-funded solar installations. There is, in fact, 
evidence to suggest that solar ratepayers may provide a net benefit to 
the grid and, hence, be the ones who cross-subsidize their non-solar 
counterparts.264 For example, rooftop solar and other low-carbon 
distributed energy resources not only help mitigate climate change but 
also reduce peak demand during the hottest hours of the day. 
California’s net metering program, along with other incentives, has 
shaved thousands of megawatts off the state’s peak demand load.265 
Peak shaving provides two key benefits to the grid. First, reductions in 
peak demand minimize, if not altogether eliminate, the need for so-
called peaker plants — usually older, more polluting plants that can 
be dispatched at relatively short notice but have such high operating 
costs that they are not profitable other than at peak demand, when 
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wholesale prices are highest.266 As a result, peak shaving abates 
pollution and reduces wholesale prices to the benefit of all ratepayers. 
Second, peak shaving reduces the need for costly transmission 
maintenance and upgrades required to deliver electricity from often 
remotely sited power plants to load centers. Pioneering utilities are 
already embracing distributed generation as an opportunity to avoid 
investments in distribution infrastructure by calling upon the 
marketplace to supply alternatives to wire upgrades and expansions.267 
Quantifying these and other benefits provided by net metering-
funded distributed generation and determining the exact costs 
imposed on the grid has proven difficult.268 In light of the plethora of 
inputs relevant to this calculus and the wide dispersion of relevant 
information, prediction markets offer an ideal methodology for 
demystifying the net value of rooftop solar and other distributed 
energy resources now and going forward. Amidst a heated debate with 
strong opinions but limited facts on both sides, prediction market 
forecasts could help state policymakers determine the appropriate 
level of solar usage fees, if any, to impose on solar electricity 
customers in their state. Prediction markets could, for example, 
forecast the capital needs for generation and transmission expansion 
conditioned on the implementation of a net metering program to 
promote solar and other low-carbon distributed generation. To 
provide a meaningful counterfactual, a second market could sell 
contracts for generation and transmission investment requirements for 
a baseline scenario without net metering. 
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D. The Trillion Dollar Question: Which Policies and Technologies Best 
Reduce Greenhouse Gases? 
Policymakers across the globe have embraced climate change 
mitigation and adaptation as top priorities.269 Now that the question 
whether to take action on climate change has been answered with a 
resounding “yes,” the challenge of figuring out how to do so looms 
large. The stakes could hardly be higher. In the continental United 
States alone, millions are projected to be at risk from rising sea 
levels.270 Annual adaptation costs are estimated at over $400 billion 
with the overall cost of relocation expected to exceed $14 trillion.271 
Over the next two decades, the worldwide capital needs of clean 
energy and energy efficiency projects are forecast to surpass $30 
trillion.272 Which public policy strategy is best suited to leverage such 
vast amounts of private-sector investment? And what technologies 
should be targeted as the most promising to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions in time to limit global warming to the crucial 2-degree 
Celsius mark,273 or the recently announced, even more ambitious goal 
of 1.5 degrees Celsius?274 
The quest for the optimal policy strategy to combat climate change 
is in high gear. As of 2016, 126 countries had adopted one or more 
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policies to promote renewable power generation, sixty-eight nations 
had implemented policies to decarbonize their transportation sectors, 
and twenty-one countries had heating and cooling policies in place.275 
Most policymakers appear to be following a trial-and-error approach, 
switching back and forth among different policies.276 Many, such as 
Australia, France, and Japan, have adopted a multi-pronged approach 
combining two or more different policy measures.277 The same trend 
can be observed among state policymakers in the United States with 
California, for example, mixing and matching no fewer than five 
different policy tools to promote low-carbon renewables.278 
Two decades of national and international experimentation with 
climate and clean energy policy have produced two key insights. First, 
not all clean energy policies are created equal.279 Second, there is no 
one-size-fits-all policy option. Instead, a policy’s success depends on a 
wide range of location-specific factors, including energy market 
regulations, lending practices, permitting rules, taxation, and 
manufacturing, to name but a few.280 With knowledge of this 
multitude of diverse and ever-changing factors widely dispersed across 
regulators, investors, and other stakeholders, prediction markets could 
serve as a valuable focal point for aggregating and weighing pertinent 
information to assess a policy’s likelihood to succeed in a given 
jurisdiction. 
The choice of policy should further be tailored to the suite of 
technologies a policymaker seeks to promote. All else being equal, 
renewable portfolio standards and other market-based policies tend to 
yield better results for more mature technologies, while emerging 
technologies fare better under a feed-in tariff or similar policy 
approach that does not add market risk to technology risk.281 Effective 
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climate policymaking, therefore, starts with identifying the 
technologies that promise the greatest reduction in greenhouse gas 
emissions. Even the most thoughtful policy strategy will only be as 
successful at mitigating climate change as the technologies it seeks to 
promote. The range of technologies is vast. Nuclear, solar, and wind 
power may be the most obvious low-carbon power generation options 
today, but ocean tidal, advanced geothermal, and other emerging 
technologies hold great promise for the future.282 Moving beyond 
generation, advanced batteries, molten salt, flywheel, compressed air, 
and other storage technologies could go a long way toward 
decarbonizing the grid. Smart thermostats, building weatherization, 
and other energy efficiency technologies, meanwhile, could reduce the 
need for new generation infrastructure and accelerate the 
decommissioning of coal-fired and other high-carbon legacy 
generators.283 No policymaker can be expected to maintain a working 
knowledge of these and other, constantly evolving technology options, 
nor should they have to rely solely on advice from a small group of 
possibly biased experts. Prediction markets could help policymakers 
answer the trillion-dollar question of which technologies, and policies, 
will deliver the greatest greenhouse gas emission reductions for their 
jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
Global warming and sea level rise represent enormous challenges for 
our planet and for policymakers. Efforts to address our changing 
climate require difficult predictions, including high-stakes bets on 
which technologies will usher in the low-carbon future. Existing legal 
institutions and conventional decision-making methods are too flawed 
to be trusted with this Herculean task. With a strong track record of 
outperforming other forecasting mechanisms across a wide range of 
contexts, prediction markets could help resolve the current policy 
gridlock and foster a new generation of smarter climate policies. In 
particular, prediction markets can improve government decision 
making through more reliable and transparent forecasts that aggregate 
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widely dispersed information in an unbiased way untainted by interest 
group politics. They also have the potential to overcome resistance to 
climate change mitigation efforts, especially among market-oriented 
conservatives. 
We have outlined only a few of the many opportunities for federal 
and state policymakers to incorporate prediction markets into the 
climate policy process. Some of our suggestions could be implemented 
immediately with no change in existing laws, while other, more 
radical proposals would require legislative action. The applications 
discussed in this Article are by no means exhaustive. In fact, our main 
goal is to alert policymakers to the near-infinite possibilities for 
prediction markets and to encourage widespread experimentation. 
Prediction markets are an incredibly promising policy tool, but their 
potential will be realized only if policymakers are willing to use them. 
We recommend starting small, perhaps with a play-money market at 
ARPA-E. Smaller-scale experimentation can create an empirical track 
record that facilitates incremental improvements to prediction market 
design and implementation. As prediction markets gain acceptance in 
the climate policy world, policymakers can expand their reach, 
possibly even delegating certain decisions to the markets themselves. 
 
